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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 March 1985

Prime Minister

CDP
1/3.

Dear Charles,

Visit of New Zealand Prime Minister

[In hot box]

I enclose briefing for Mr Lange's call on the Prime Minister at 10.30 am on Monday 4 March. The Cabinet Office are briefing separately on the problem of intelligence links with New Zealand.

We are following up the news that Mr Hawke has called for an emergency ANZUS meeting and will ensure that the telegraphic report, for which our High Commission in Canberra has been asked, reaches you as quickly as possible.

Mr Lange's policies on defence and disarmament matters were clearly set out in a characteristic speech which he gave at a seminar run by the Institute of Policy Studies in Wellington on 22 February. I attach a copy, with significant points highlighted. He is speaking at the Oxford Union this evening. We are arranging for the text to be sent to you as soon as it is available.

I am sending a copy of this letter and brief to Richard Mottram.

Yours ever,

L V Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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CALL BY MR DAVID LANGE, PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND, MONDAY,
4 MARCH 1985

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1. Our Objectives

Short Term

- (i) to restate UK policy on ship visits; and
- (ii) to prevent a disagreement about nuclear deterrence in the South Pacific from damaging broader Western interests.

Long Term

To persuade New Zealand to revert to former policies.

2. Arguments to Use

- (i) Regret differences with close friend on such an important issue; the need for a nuclear deterrent to contain the Soviet threat.
- (ii) Wish to dampen public controversy. Our conversation confidential.
- (iii) Western nations face common threat. Members of Alliances cannot pick and choose. Nuclear deterrence has brought stability, 40 years of peace in Europe in whose ^{past} conflicts many New Zealanders have given their lives.
- (iv) Aware of US restrictions on defence co-operation. No wish to see dispute extend into other fields and damage trade or joint Western position in South East Asia and South Pacific.
- (v) But have to tell you that New Zealand ban would rule out RN visits.
- (vi) Understand Mr Hawke calling for emergency meeting of ANZUS Council. Britain cannot mediate. Two areas where we might elucidate issues: the role of the nuclear deterrent in ensuring stability, the Western approach to disarmament.



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- (vii) Chief of General Staff (CGS) planning to visit New Zealand next month. Evidence of our wish to maintain dialogue and our defence co-operation.
- (viii) [If raised] UK attaches importance to New Zealand contract for A4 aircraft update. Confident that British bid deserves to win avionics element.

4. His Objectives

To convince British Government that present NZ policy is irreversible, neither anti-Western nor damaging to NATO, but appropriate for New Zealand's unique geographical position and is a constructive policy for keeping nuclear weapons out of South Pacific.

5. Your Response

- (i) Soviet capability does not stop at NATO boundaries; development of Soviet Pacific fleet and activities at Cam Ranh Bay evidence of need for worldwide vigilance.
- (ii) Dangerous to make optimistic assumptions about Soviet intentions in event of conflict. Prudent to base defence policy on knowledge of hostile power's capability.
- (iii) Soviet messages of support demonstrate wedge-driving. Russians could raise the low level of their current activity in South Pacific.
- (iv) Declaratory measures such as South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone would not provide security when it is most needed - in a crisis.

6. Press Line

Question of ship visits discussed. Prime Minister explained Britain's policy. Nature of discussion between Commonwealth Prime Ministers confidential. Not for Britain to mediate in dispute within ANZUS but anxious to do what we can to help towards solution of current differences.

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7. Background

Mr Lange has come to London at his own initiative. Lady Young paid a welcoming call on him on 27 February. Mr Lange had a audience with The Queen on 1 March. He spoke at the Oxford Union the same day to the motion "This House believes that nuclear weapons are morally indefensible".

In February New Zealand rejected a US request for a warship visit since they were unable to confirm that the ship was definitely not nuclear armed. The Americans have unilaterally cancelled ANZUS and multinational exercises including one involving the UK.

They have denied moves to impose economic sanctions.

We are partners with New Zealand and Australia in the Five Power Defence Arrangements which provide for consultations in the event of a threat to Malaysia or Singapore.

^kUN/NZ bilateral defence co-operation. Considerable number of NZ personnel train in UK - 250 in 1983/84: two places at RCDS for 1985: 40 exchange officers per year in each direction: £100,000 last year on Defence Policy Fund assistance for training at UK establishments. Number of bilateral and Five Power Defence Arrangements exercises on regular basis. Chiefs of Staff ^{pp} of UK/NZ/Australia meet (BRITANZ) approximately every 18 months: last meeting November 1984. Chief of General Staff plans visit in April/May: Mr Stanley in September.

Defence Sales. The New Zealand Government are about to award a significant (£50m) contract for updating their A4 (Skyhawk) military aircraft. GEC/Marconi are running neck and neck against US competition for the avionics order. NZ Government may wish to place order with Americans as an indication of commitment to relations with US - and to ensure supply of US air defence missiles. Order important to GEC/Marconi since six other Air Forces likely to follow NZ choice.

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/Nuclear



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Nuclear Free Zones. We are opposed to creation of total nuclear free zones into which the Soviet Union can still target weapons. But we have to accept the policies of eg Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway which prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons on national territory in peace time. These policies, however, are not an obstacle to ship visits.

South Pacific. New Zealand Governments, both National and Labour, concentrate some 80% of their aid in the South Pacific. They have urged us to maintain our network of six diplomatic missions in the islands and an aid programme (now running at about £15 million) because they fear that others, such as the Russians, would move ⁱⁿ if we left.

Public opinion in New Zealand is running strongly in favour of the nuclear warships ban. Americans regarded as bullies, expressions of resentment even from prominent right-wing establishment figures. Simultaneously there is overwhelming public support for ANZUS, on the basis that New Zealand has the right to determine its own policy on nuclear ship visits. The Government has played on patriotic feelings by portraying Mr McLay, the Leader of the Opposition, as an American lackey.

South Pacific Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 March 1985

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SPEECH NOTES

RT HON DAVID LANGE
PRIME MINISTER
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SEMINAR ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY

TIME: 7.40 pm
DATE: Friday, 22 February 1985
VENUE: Lecture Room 5, Hugh McKenzie, VUW

1.

I am pleased to have the opportunity tonight to talk to you about disarmament and security. Tomorrow you will look in detail at a range of international arms control and disarmament issues. Tonight I want to talk about a number of issues that I think are particularly important for New Zealand.

There is a strong and growing belief in New Zealand that nuclear weapons expose us all to the risk of annihilation. The Government shares that view. An end to the nuclear arms race is essential to the security of all countries - those that have nuclear weapons and those that do not.

Every new development in nuclear weapons seems to open up a more alarming and potentially de-stabilising prospect than the last.

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Nobody who thinks about it can fail to be deeply worried by the way in which nuclear weapons states continue their intense competition to develop and deploy ever more deadly weapons. Deterrence is one thing; its apparently endless expansion is quite another. The number of nuclear weapons and their technological sophistication long ago passed beyond any sensible limit. There are enough weapons already in existence to destroy every part of the world several times over. Yet, while progress on measures of arms control is painfully slow, the ingenuity of those who design weapons systems seems unlimited. It is not only weapons; it is also new environments. The possibility of an arms race in outer space now clearly exists. It is thoroughly disquieting. It is very much to be hoped that the new and most welcome bilateral arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union - talks which encompass space weaponry - will prevent the expansion of rivalry into that area.

Another recent development has had a particular impact on opinion in New Zealand.

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Over the past two or three years a new body of scientific work has developed. It suggests that the global climatic and long-term biological consequences of a nuclear war are likely to be much worse than had previously been thought. The awesome immediate destruction that would be brought about by nuclear weapons has been known for a long time. What has not been appreciated until recently is that, even if only a fraction of existing nuclear arsenals were involved, a nuclear war would have even more far reaching effects. Smoke and dust would prevent the sun's warmth from reaching the earth's surface. Temperatures could fall drastically for weeks or months on end.

(A)

There is another dimension to this. It is that all countries, whether or not they are directly involved in a nuclear exchange, would undoubtedly suffer. A nuclear winter would not respect borders or hemispheres.

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(A) We in New Zealand, who seem so far from the trouble spots of the world, would most likely feel its icy chill. The possibility exists that that winter could be so severe as to extinguish the human species.

What we have been told about a nuclear winter has added to strongly held beliefs in New Zealand that the present state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue. That the New Zealand Government should play its part was the clear message at the last election. It is the message contained in the literally thousands of letters that people in all walks of life have sent - and continue to send - to me and my colleagues. It is shown by the vigour of the numerous peace groups in New Zealand. It is reflected by the number of local bodies which have declared themselves nuclear-free as a symbol of their opposition to nuclear weaponry. Over 90 of them, covering two-thirds of our population, have declared themselves nuclear-free.

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Many responsible people think that nuclear weapons threaten us rather than protect us. Many feel that far from bringing protection, nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race are the single biggest threat to their security. They are not alone in this assessment. The Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament, adopted by consensus by the member countries of the United Nations in 1978, makes the same assessment. It declared that "the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind".

The Government has responded to the ground swell of opinion in New Zealand. It is committed to doing all it can to play its part in the process of disarmament.

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The principle which shapes my view of arms control between the nuclear powers and which guides my actions as Prime Minister of New Zealand is that stated by the Secretary of Defence in his address to the Otago University Foreign Policy School in 1983. It is the principle that a disarmament or arms control measure must meet the essential requirement that the security of all the countries concerned is undiminished.

Over the years the United States and the Soviet Union have worked themselves into an extraordinarily difficult and dangerous position with regard to nuclear weapons and security. Moving away from that position, while simultaneously preserving a sense of security, will take a good deal of time and it will be difficult to achieve. An essential condition for progress in this direction is full acceptance of the collective judgement made by the United Nations that the arms race does not bring security but rather reduces it.

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In resuming their bilateral arms control talks - previously broken off by the Soviet Union to the dismay of the rest of the world - the United States and the Soviet Union appear to have endorsed that judgement. They have spoken of the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. There is hope there. We must do what we can to nourish it.

New Zealand does not have nuclear weapons. We never have had them and we want no part of them in the future. There is a limit to what small countries like ourselves can achieve. But that does not excuse us from action. We cannot hide our heads in the sand. Quite apart from the moral imperative, simple self-interest dictates that we should seek to eliminate the risks inherent in the present situation.

Within our region we have sought and achieved the acceleration of work on a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone.

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The idea of such a zone has been around for over a decade. The current proposal was first put forward by Australia in 1983. Last August, at the South Pacific Forum meeting in Tuvalu, all the Heads of Government in the region agreed to establish a zone as soon as possible. They also agreed on the overall principles that should shape it.

Detailed work on drafting a treaty is proceeding rapidly. Our aim is that it will be far enough advanced for South Pacific leaders to consider a complete text in August at the next Forum meeting in Rarotonga. Officials have met several times - most recently at the beginning of this month - to work out the details. These discussions have been productive and the overall shape of a treaty is now clear.

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The key principle of the Zone is that it will prohibit the possession, stationing, testing or use of any nuclear explosive device in the South Pacific region.

This will be a real advance on the present situation. At the moment all the countries in the region - except two - have adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But this treaty does not prevent the nuclear weapons states from stationing weapons under their control in a third country. A South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone will involve a legally binding commitment by Forum countries not to allow such stationing on their territories. It will significantly reduce the possibility of a direct confrontation in the region between the nuclear weapons states. By so doing it will enhance the security of the region and the common security of us all.

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New Zealand cannot, of course, establish a regional zone by itself. Whatever is endorsed in Rarotonga must, in every aspect, have the full support of all Forum countries. Forum countries have different views on the arrangements that will best serve to maintain their security. This is reflected in their different approaches to such questions as access to their ports and air fields by vessels and aircraft of other countries. For this reason, the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone will not touch upon port visits. Whether such visits take place will be up to each country in the region to decide for itself.

If it is to be fully effective, the Zone must attract the support of the nuclear weapons states. For that reason, the Zone treaty will be constructed in such a way that - as is the case with the Treaty of Tlateloco and the Latin American zone - the nuclear weapons states will be able formally to associate themselves with it.

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They will be invited, as they were in the case of Latin America, to accept a solemn and binding understanding not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against this region. That, too, will enhance the security of every country in the region.

Another important feature of the zone is that it will serve to bring further pressure to bear on France to halt its activities at Mururoa.

This Government has made clear to the French authorities its total rejection and condemnation of their programme of nuclear testing in the South Pacific. All the independent countries of the region, and several Latin American states, have conveyed the same message to Paris. Yet despite this clear and unequivocal response, France continues to ignore regional sentiment and carries on testing.

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If the tests are as safe and as non-polluting as France claims, then I see no reason why they cannot be carried out off the coast of France.

The final point I need to make about the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone is that international law imposes limits on it. In particular, neither New Zealand nor anybody else has the right to restrict the passage of ships on the high seas. So the zone cannot stop nuclear warships from entering or passing through the South Pacific region.

In the wider international arena New Zealand is exerting its influence in support of arms control and disarmament. In speaking to the United Nations General Assembly last September and in my discussions in New York with the foreign Ministers of the five nuclear weapons states, I made as strong a plea as I could for progress in this field. I will carry the same message when I speak to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in a fortnight's time.

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But our effort is not limited to urging the states most directly involved to do better. Where we are able, we make a practical contribution to disarmament, by supporting measures that we think may yield some concrete and useful result. That is why we share with Australia the responsibility for promoting a United Nations resolution calling for a comprehensive test ban.

Such a ban has been properly described as the most important single step in the arms control process. The United Nations Secretary-General has spoken of it, in his statement on disarmament questions last December, as "the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament".

A comprehensive test ban would make a major contribution to arms control.

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Since new weapons designs could no longer be tested, a comprehensive test ban would inhibit their development. At the same time, a comprehensive test ban would reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty by preventing non-nuclear weapons states from testing any device that they might develop.

When a test ban is put in place, it will need to be verified. That is fundamental. So, along with other countries, we are working towards the establishment of an international seismic detection system. This would pick up the tell-tale seismic traces of nuclear explosions. We have the seismic expertise. New Zealand's location would fill a gap in a world-wide system. So, we are working on it. It is not spectacular. But it is a solid, pragmatic contribution towards disarmament.

So, too, is our support for the non-proliferation regime and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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We believe that the balance of interests embodied in the Treaty is sound. It contributes both to halting the spread of nuclear weapons and to bringing an end to those already in existence. The Treaty is to be reviewed later this year. New Zealand will work hard to make sure that review is successful and that the non-proliferation regime is strengthened by it.

The Government has acted promptly and decisively to give practical effect to its commitment to disarmament and arms control.

Our policy - which is essentially that no nuclear weapons will come into New Zealand - is clear and consistent. We will stand by it.

That policy has prompted considerable debate about New Zealand's security arrangements and in particular the ANZUS alliance. I once again restate this point:

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U Our policy is neither anti-American nor anti-alliance. It is simply anti-nuclear.

(A) NB The best assessment of the Government's military advisers is that there is no explicit military threat to New Zealand or to immediate New Zealand interests. There is however in the considered view of those advisers an increased potential for intrusion into the South Pacific by outside powers. New Zealand's first priority in terms of its security is to safeguard its own interests in its own region.

In terms of conventional forces, the Government proposes to maintain the capacity needed to make an independent effective contribution to low intensity operations of the kind likely to arise in the Pacific.

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It does so in the recognition, expressed in successive defence reviews, that our more limited national interests are not and will not always be identical with those of our larger partners. The United States over recent years has made it clear that its capacities are limited and that it expects its regional allies to look after regional security problems.

In terms of nuclear weaponry, the security of the South Pacific is best served by the creation of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

For a very long time now, dating back to the period before ANZUS, New Zealand has subscribed to the concept of collective security. It would have been very surprising if this had not been the case. Small countries such as ourselves with limited military means at their disposal must look beyond their own resources to guard their interests.

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In the absence of an effective collective security system within the United Nations, we have formed alliances. That must be a constant in any New Zealand government's foreign and defence policies. It has not been altered for my Government by the judgements we make about the acceptability of nuclear weapons in New Zealand. It will not change in the future. Our commitment to ANZUS and to the broader Western community remains firm. The ANZUS defence partnership reflects the fundamental and enduring common interests we share with Australia and the United States. The ANZUS alliance has proved resilient and dynamic, adapting successfully to meeting changing circumstances. ANZUS continues to serve New Zealand's interests well.

Let me take this opportunity to deal with a few misconceptions about our anti-nuclear policy. Some critics claim that we are seeking to enjoy the benefits, without sharing the risks, of alliance membership.

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Others say that we are somehow not pulling our weight in the alliance by refusing to admit nuclear weapons to New Zealand.

From New Zealand's perspective, ANZUS has always been an alliance resting on conventional defence co-operation. In this, we have certainly always pulled our weight. The Government intends to carry on doing so. Our willingness to participate in conventional defence co-operation will continue.

New Zealand cannot however be defended by nuclear weapons. We do not wish to be defended by nuclear weapons. The United States and many of the allies of the United States carry the burden of knowing that the deterrent which defends them will also destroy them and all the rest of us if it is ever used. No nation should carry that burden. It is a burden to be diminished by the process of arms control negotiations leading to responsible and verifiable agreements.

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Such is the importance and permanence of the community of interests New Zealand shares with its friends and allies, the United States and Australia, that I am confident that we ANZUS partners can make whatever adjustment proves necessary in our defence co-operation to maintain the integrity of each member's respective positions.

More generally, as an integral member of the Western community, New Zealand is determined to carry on playing its part in upholding Western values and principles. Our major role in helping to underpin the security of the South Pacific testifies to this.

It has been argued that New Zealand has weakened the bargaining position of the Western alliance by its action in demonstrating a positive commitment to the control of nuclear weapons.

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That argument derives from the view that successful arms control negotiations depend on one side gaining or maintaining a clear advantage over the other. The New Zealand Government holds that it is the relentlessly competitive element among the nuclear powers which has made the word deterrent a synonym for escalation. We reject that element, as the United Nations has rejected it. We ask the nuclear powers to reject it.

The first duty of any government is to have regard to the security of its country and citizens. In pursuit of that goal my Government will continue to do two things. At the national, regional and global level we shall play our full part in limiting the risks posed by nuclear weapons. We shall also continue to make a full contribution to the conventional operations of the ANZUS alliance.

MEETING WITH MR. LANGE

1. A change in New Zealand's vote on Falklands at the UN would be taken very seriously - particularly at a time when the Argentine position on normalisation of relations seems to be hardening, and this year's Resolution seems likely to be worse than last year's.
2. Hope that we can reach accommodation on nuclear ships visits, on same basis as we do with Australia and Scandinavia. Otherwise may preclude all naval visits.
3. Done our best for you on access for butter. Guaranteed until 1988, though quantities fixed only until 1986. Will press hard for continued access after 1988.
4. Propose talks between senior officials on defence/disarmament issues. Soviet threat in no way diminished.
5. Grateful for statement on Hong Kong.
6. Explain aim to try to shorten CHOGM meetings. Preferred dates for next one 18-21 October, 1985.
7. Nice words about Mr. Young as High Commissioner. Look forward to welcoming Mr. Walding as his successor.

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