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KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: ARAB/ISRAEL
SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN WAS IN BOUYANT MOOD. HE ARGUED THAT THE FOCUS OF US EFFORTS SHOULD SHIFT FROM LEBANON TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HE WANTED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS WITHIN WEEKS RATHER THAN MONTHS WITH OR WITHOUT THE PLO PROVIDED THAT THE US WOULD GIVE HIM SUPPORT OVER SECURITY. PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED US COMMITMENT TO SCR 242.

DETAIL

2. RAPHEL BRIEFED MINISTER TODAY ON KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT. IN ADDITION TO THE MEETINGS WITH MUBARAK THE KING HAD HAD BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, WEINBERGER AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND SHULTZ (TWICE). HE HAD BEEN IN A BOUYANT AND OPTIMISTIC MOOD THROUGHOUT.
3. KING HUSSEIN'S MAIN THEME HAD BEEN THE IMPORTANCE OF SHIFTING THE FOCUS OF US PEACE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM LEBANON TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HE WAS CLEARLY PLEASED WITH THE SUCCESS OF HIS INITIATIVE TO RECALL THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT. HE WANTED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS WITHIN WEEKS RATHER THAN MONTHS WITH OR WITHOUT THE PLO PROVIDED THAT HE WERE ASSURED OF US SUPPORT TO ENABLE HIM TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE THREAT FROM THE SYRIANS AND PALESTINIAN REJECTIONISTS.
4. THE KING CLAIMED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE ENCOURAGING DISSIDENT PLO MEMBERS TO INFILTRATE INTO JORDAN AND STIR UP TROUBLE THERE. THE KING FEARED THAT THIS SORT OF SYRIAN MEDDLING WOULD INCREASE IF THERE WERE PROGRESS ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND THAT, AS IN 1980 SYRIAN FORCES WOULD AGAIN MASS ON JORDAN'S NORTHERN BORDER. THE JORDANIANS WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD HANDLE THE INFILTRATION AND TERRORISM THREAT BUT ANXIOUS ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIA. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE US HAD EVIDENCE OF SOME INCREASED SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR PLO DISSIDENTS IN JORDAN THOUGH NOT TO THE EXTENT THE JORDANIANS CLAIMED. SECURITY ASSISTANCE WAS DIFFICULT SO LONG AS KING HUSSEIN REMAINED ALOOF FROM THE PEACE PROCESS (THOUGH THE PROPOSED SALE OF 1613 STINGER SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES HAS BEEN NOTIFIED TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION ARE SEEKING FUNDS FOR THE JORDAN LOGISTICS PROGRAMME). IT WAS DIFFICULT TO OFFER THE SORT OF GUARANTEES KING HUSSEIN WOULD LIKE BUT THE AMERICANS HAD TRIED TO OFFER HIM SOME REASSURANCE.
5. KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING OUT APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE INTENDED TO HAVE PROMINENT WEST BANKERS PRESENT WHEN HE MET ARAFAT IN THE HOPE

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OF INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON HIM TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. BUT HE HAD ALSO HINTED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE CHANNEL FOR THE EXPRESSION OF PALESTINIAN VIEWS. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY PEACE NEGOTIATION WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF SCR 242 SINCE JORDAN WAS NOT A SIGNATORY OF CAMP DAVID. RAPHEL SAID THAT THIS POINT WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON.

6. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCH WITH MUBARAK AND KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN ARRANGED ONLY BECAUSE OF THE COINCIDENCE OF THEIR VISITS: NO ONE HAD BEEN PRESSING FOR IT. THEY HAD COVERED MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND. BOTH MUBARAK AND KING HUSSEIN HAD EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR US RESOLUTION IN LEBANON AND FOR A SHIFT OF FOCUS TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PRESIDENT HAD REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO SCR 242 AND TO THE POSITIONS SET OUT IN HIS SPEECH OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1982, AND HAD STRESSED THE NEED TO GET A PRACTICAL PEACE PROCESS UNDER WAY. WHEN KING HUSSEIN HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT PEACE TALKS MIGHT BE DRAGGED OUT INTERMINABLY, THE PRESIDENT HAD GIVEN AN ASSURANCE THAT HE WOULD APPROACH THEM WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY. ALL THREE LEADERS HAD AGREED THAT SYRIA POSED A REAL SECURITY THREAT AND WOULD TRY TO CAUSE FURTHER TROUBLE.

7. RAPHEL CONCLUDED THAT THESE TALKS BEEN MODERATELY ENCOURAGING AND HAD LAID A HELPFUL FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER ACTIVITY ON THE PEACE PROCESS. BUT, AS ALWAYS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THERE WAS AMPLE SCOPE FOR UPSETS ALONG THE WAY.

WRIGHT

MIDDLE EAST

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