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SIR J BULLARD  
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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 27 OF 6 JANUARY  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS MOSCOW  
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW CAIRO THE HAGUE.

YOUR TELS NOS 4 AND 7: LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND REMAINS SYMPATHETIC TO THE AIM OF AN EXPANDED UN ROLE. HE HOPES THAT UNIFIL MIGHT BE DEPLOYED TO OVERSEE A FURTHER ISRAELI PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND THAT THIS COULD HELP TO BRING ABOUT AN EXPANDED UN PRESENCE IN THE BEIRUT AREA, BUT HE CANNOT ACT UNTIL THE PARTIES CONCERNED INCLUDING THE SOVIETS AND SYRIANS, AGREE. SEE ALSO COMMENT IN MIFT.

2. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR NEARLY AN HOUR THIS MORNING (5 JANUARY). LIU (ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS), WAS PRESENT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR READ THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE THROUGH CAREFULLY AND GAVE WARM THANKS FOR IT. HE SAID THAT HE WAS VERY INTERESTED IN CONSIDERING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO ACHIEVE AN EXPANDED UN ROLE IN LEBANON. BUT IN ORDER FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO ACT IT WAS NECESSARY TO MEET THE FOUR CONDITIONS TO WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY REFERRED (PARA 2 OF NY TEL 40 3). THE KEY WAS TO OBTAIN SOME UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS. HE WAS TRYING TO PERSUADE THE U.S. OF THIS. JURQUHART LEFT THIS MORNING FOR WASHINGTON TO

... (partially obscured text)

SEE SHULTZ. HE STRESSED TO ME WHEN I SAW HIM BRIEFLY BEFORE HE LEFT THAT HE TOO PERSONALLY REGARDED BRINGING THE RUSSIANS IN AS ESSENTIAL THOUGH HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD AGREE NOW OR INDEED PROBABLY EVERY. HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BELIEVES THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS UNDER SUCH PRESSURE THAT HE WILL HAVE TO DO SO EVENTUALLY).

3. LIU NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN THREE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE CHRISTMAS. FIRSTLY, THERE WAS GENAYEL'S SECURITY PLAN, SECONDLY THERE WAS AN APPARENT CHANGE IN ISRAELI THINKING IN FAVOUR OF A FURTHER UNILATERAL PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, AS WELL AS A MORE FAVOURABLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS UNIFIL (RABIN FOR EXAMPLE HAD SPOKEN POSITIVELY OF THE FORCE'S ACHIEVEMENT). THIRDLY, THERE WAS INCREASING CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE ON PRESIDENT REAGAN TO WITHDRAW THE MARINES.

4. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HOPED THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE TOWARDS AN EXPANDED UN ROLE IN TWO AREAS - DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL IN CONNECTION WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL SOUTH, AND AN EXPANSION OF THE UN PRESENCE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. THE FIRST OF THESE WOULD BE LINKED TO THE ISRAELI PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL MENTIONED ABOVE AND OVERSEE IT USING UNIFIL'S EXISTING MANDATE WHICH WAS TO FACILITATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO REQUEST SUCH A DEPLOYMENT AND FOR THE AREA OF OPERATION TO BE AGREED WITH THE PARTIES. HE THOUGH THE SYRIANS WOULD SUPPORT THIS. EXPANSION OF THE UN ROLE IN THE BEIRUT AREA, PROBABLY FOLLOWING THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL IN THE SOUTH, WOULD BE EITHER THROUGH THE USE OF UN FORCES OR OBSERVERS. OBSERVERS WOULD BE EASIER. DEPLOYMENT IN CONNECTION WITH AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL COULD ENCOURAGE ACCEPTANCE OF AN EXPANDED UN PRESENCE IN THE BEIRUT AREA, PARTICULARLY IF THE DRUZE THOUGHT THAT SUCH A PRESENCE WOULD PREVENT ATTACKS ON THEIR POSITIONS. THE COMPOSITION OF THE UN CONTINGENTS IN BOTH CASES WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED. THE NEPALESE WERE READY TO RETURN. SOME OF THE BOSNIES COULD ALSO HELP.

5. I QUESTIONED WHETHER DEPLOYMENT IN CONNECTION WITH AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, DESIRABLE THOUGH IT MIGHT BE, WOULD REALLY LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT ON AN EXPANDED UN DEPLOYMENT IN THE BEIRUT AREA. NEITHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NOR LIU WERE ABLE TO GIVE CONVINCING REASONS WHY THE ONE SHOULD LEAD TO ANOTHER. THEY MERELY SAID THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE FIRST OPERATION WOULD ENHANCE THE PRESTIGE OF UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE LEBANON.

6. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACHED TO THE IDEAS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND ASKED HOW WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN PROMOTING AN EXPANDED UN ROLE. I ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF HE COULD SEE A WAY IN WHICH UN FORCES MIGHT SOON TAKE OVER FROM THE MNF. HE COULD NOT, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE COULD TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO ACCEPT UN INVOLVEMENT. HE HAD SEEN THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY WHO CONTINUED TO EXPRESS SYRIAN RESERVATIONS. HE HAD POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT ONLY THE UN COULD PROVIDE A REPLACEMENT FOR THE MNF. IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOWEVER  
~~WHETHER GENAYEL HAD BEEN REPRESENTING CURRENT SYRIAN VIEWS~~

YOU ACCURATELY SAY THAT YOU HAD BEEN REPRESENTING CURRENT SYRIAN VIEWS. WHEN I MENTIONED THAT YOU WOULD BE GOING TO DAMASCUS NEXT WEEK, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SUGGESTED THAT THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR OBTAINING AN AUTHORITATIVE VIEW OF THE SYRIAN POSITION AND FOR EXERCISING PERSUASION.

7. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ALSO EXPRESSED SOME UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REALLY WANTED. HE REITERATED THAT HE WOULD NEED A SPECIFIC REQUEST FROM THEM BEFORE HE COULD TAKE ANY ACTION. HE THOUGHT THAT AT PRESENT THEY PREFERRED THE MWF TO A UN PRESENCE. HOWEVER, THE DAY WOULD COME WHEN THE MWF WOULD WITHDRAW AND THEY WOULD HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO PLAY THE UN CARD.

8. I ASKED ABOUT FLYING A UN FLAG OVER SABRA AND CHATILA. LIU NOTED THAT A MAIN TASK OF THE 50 UN OBSERVERS IN SEIRUT WAS TO CHECK ON THE SITUATION IN THOSE CAMPS. IN ADDITION, UNRWA HAD FACILITIES THERE AND IT WAS POSSIBLE (THOUGH HE WOULD NEED TO CHECK THIS) THAT THE UN FLAG ALREADY FLEW OVER THESE FACILITIES. BUT THE UN FLAG ALONE WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO PROTECT THE CAMPS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE SYMBOLICAL VALUE OF FLYING A FLAG SINCE HE COULD NOT SEE THAT IT COULD BE ANY KIND OF SHIELD AND THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULTIES BOTH IN RELATION TO A PRECEDENT BEING SET AND MORE IMPORTANTLY IN REGARD TO LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. I SHARE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DOUBTS. THERE IS NO REAL ANALOGY BETWEEN FLYING THE UN FLAG ALONGSIDE THE NATIONAL FLAG - ON SHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS AND FLYING THE UN FLAG OVER THE SABRA AND CHATILA REFUGEE CAMPS. THE CAMPS ARE PART OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGN TERRITORY AND, IN THEORY AT LEAST, ARE SUBJECT TO LEBANESE JURISDICTION AND CONTROL IN THE SAME WAY AS OTHER PARTS OF ITS TERRITORY. EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE UN FLAG COULD BE FLOWN OVER A UN PRESENCE IN THE CAMPS, TO FLY THE FLAG OVER THE CAMPS THEMSELVES WOULD NECESSARILY IMPLY THAT THEY HAD PASSED TO UN ADMINISTRATION).

9. SUMMING UP HIS RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE REMAINED READY BEHIND THE DOOR. THE SECRETARIAT HAD CONTINGENCY MEASURES READY FOR AN EXPANDED UN ROLE. BUT BEFORE HE COULD HELP WORK WAS NEEDED WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED. HE HOPED YOUR VISIT TO DAMASCUS WOULD PROVIDE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SYRIAN POSITION AND PERSUADE THEM TO ACCEPT UN INVOLVEMENT.

10. SEE COMMENT IN WIFT.

THOMSON