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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 11 OF 6 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,

DAMASCUS, CAIRO, MOSCOW, THE HAGUE

ROUTINE HELSINKI, SUVA, OSLO, DUBLIN, ACCRA, DUBAI, STOCKHOLM

OUR TEL NO.4 (NOT TO ALL): UN FORCES IN LEBANON

1. AN URGENT STUDY HAS THROWN UP THE FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES FOR WIDER UN INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON:

(A) BEIRUT AREA. COMPLETE REPLACEMENT OF MNF BY A UN FORCE (WITH A SIMILAR MANDATE QUOTE TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND LAF IN THE BEIRUT AREA UNQUOTE) WOULD BE THE IDEAL ANSWER. BUT WE REALISE THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING AGREEMENT TO THIS IN ONE FELL SWOOP. IT MIGHT BE TACTICALLY SENSIBLE THEREFORE TO LEAD UP TO IT BY STARTING WITH SOMETHING LIKE THE ITALIAN IDEA FOR PUTTING A UN PRESENCE INTO THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS OF SABRA AND SHATILA, AND BOURJ AL BARAJNEH. ADDITIONAL TASKS MIGHT BE SUPERVISING THE CEASEFIRE TALKS (AN EMINENTLY NEUTRAL ROLE) AND A PRESENCE AT BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (TO BE DECLARED NEUTRAL GROUND IN THE NEW LEBANESE SECURITY PLAN, ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS):

(B) DEPLOYMENT OF UN OBSERVERS IN THE SHOUF, AS DISCUSSED IN THE WAKE OF THE 25 SEPTEMBER 1983 CEASEFIRE:

(C) UN FORCES TO PLAY ROLE ENVISAGED FOR MNF IN PHASE 2 OF LEBANESE SECURITY PLAN IE DEPLOYMENT ON COAST ROADS NORTH AND SOUTH OF BEIRUT AND ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS ROAD. POSSIBLY EXTENDED TO PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN TRIPOLI:

(D) UN SUPERVISION OF DISENGAGEMENT OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. COULD TAKE THE FORM OF OBSERVERS OR PREFERABLY A CONVENTIONAL FORCE WHICH MOVED INTO AREAS SUCCESSIVELY EVACUATED IN STAGES BY ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES:

(E) SOUTHERN LEBANON. SECURITY COUNCIL WILL PRESUMABLY NOT

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AGREE TO UNIFIL'S MANDATE BEING ENDED COMPLETELY IN FAVOUR OF OTHER UN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON, AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MAY WANT RESIDUAL UN PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH, THOUGH WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE BULK OF UNIFIL MOVED FURTHER NORTH TO TAKE UP MORE USEFUL DUTIES IF (A BIG IF) TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WERE TO AGREE. POSSIBLE TASKS: CONTINUING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POPULATION, PRESENCE IN TYRE AND SIDON PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS, UNTSO OBSERVERS TO REMAIN ON ISRAEL/LEBANON BORDER.

2. COMMENT. OPTION A IS OBVIOUSLY OF MOST IMMEDIATE INTEREST, GIVEN OUR PRIORITY OF PROMOTING DEPLOYMENT OF UN FORCES TO ALLOW HONOURABLE EXIT BY MNF. OPTION B COULD ALSO HELP IN THIS RESPECT BUT WE ARE NO LONGER VERY CONVINCED THAT PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT TO ENFORCEMENT OF CEASEFIRE IN THE SHOUP AND SYRIAN/SOVIET OBJECTIONS WOULD NO DOUBT STILL BE STRONG. OPTION (C) WOULD NEED FURTHER CLARIFICATION FROM LEBANESE WHO SEEM TO HAVE NO VERY FIRM IDEAS. IT COULD BE SUGGESTED TO LEBANESE AS WAY OF RESISTING EXTENSION OF MNF DEPLOYMENT.

OPTION D COULD PROBABLY BE SOLD TO ISRAELIS (TEL AVIV TEL NO.351) BUT WOULD HAVE TO BE FRAMED TO TAKE CARE OF SYRIAN SENSITIVITIES ABOUT NOT PUTTING THEIR FORCES ON SAME BASIS AS THOSE OF ISRAEL, AND LEBANESE FEARS OF PARTITION (BEIRUT TEL NO.747). ON OPTION (E) WE NOTE LIKELY ISRAELI OBJECTIONS (TEL AVIV TEL NO.351) BUT SHARE YOUR VIEW (YOUR TEL NO.3, PARA 7) THAT SOME FORM OF CONTINUING UN ROLE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON MAY BE NECESSARY FOR ANY PACKAGE. IF, AS PART OF THE PACKAGE THE LEBANESE ARMY, INCORPORATING LOCAL MILITIAS, HAD MOVED INTO THE SOUTH WITH THE MAIN TASK OF PREVENTING SOUTHWARD INFILTRATION, ISRAELI OBJECTIONS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE LESS.

3. THERE ARE MANY POSSIBLE VARIATIONS. ONE COMMON THEME TO OPTIONS A, C AND E IS PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS. THIS MIGHT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR EG A NEW RESOLUTION WHICH REFERRE BACK TO SCR 521 (AUTHORISING THE INCREASE IN UN OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT AFTER THE MASSACRES): AND THE ORIGINAL ROLE OF THE MNF (ALSO PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS):' AND AUTHORISED A UN PRESENCE WHEREVER REQUIRED TO ASSIST IN THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS, IN-

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CLUDING PALESTINIANS (USING SOME OF THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED IN YOUR TEL NO.1469 OF 30 NOVEMBER (NOT TO ALL)? EVEN ON SUCH A BASIS HOWEVER THE DRAFTING OF A UN FORCE'S MANDATE AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD NOT BE STRAIGHTFORWARD.

4. YOUR COMMENTS AND THOSE OF OTHER ADDRESSEES WOULD BE WELCOM (REPEATED TO CAIRO FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY). BUT SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD NOW DISCUSS THESE INFORMALLY WITH URQUHART AND REPORT HIS REACTIONS.

5. WE ARE REPEATING RECENT RELEVANT TELEGRAMS TO POSTS IN THOSE UNIFIL CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES WHO HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THEM. THEY SHOULD NOT (NOT) SEEK VIEWS FROM HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THIS STAGE. BUT COMMENTS ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY OF THE ABOVE OPTIONS FOR WIDER UN ACTIVITY WOULD B WELCOME.

HOWE

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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NEWS DEPT

UND

NAD

WED

SED

ECD(E)

FINANCE DEPT

PROTOCOL DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/FUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

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