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TELEGRAM NUMBER 570 OF 7 DECEMBER 1983

REPEATED ROUTINE FOR INFO TO MOSCOW , PARIS, ROME, UKMIS

NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

MY TELNO 557 : US MIDDLE EAST POLICY

- 1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON, HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS IN DSPAIR WITH THE AMERICANS FOLLOWING THE RECENT AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND THAT THE LATEST EVENTS IN LEBANON WERE UNFORTUNATELY IN L'INE WITH WHAT HE HIMSELF HAD PREDICTED WOULD HAPPEN. HE HAD NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND HOW TO REACT, BUT WAS CONTEMPLATING TELLING PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT HE SHOULD FORGET HIS MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE. THE KING SPOKE VAGUELY OF THE NEED FOR A WIDER CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT DID NOT SPELL OUT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND SEMI COLON HE SAID HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 16 DECEMBER, AND HE WILL NO DOUBT SPELL OUT HIS THOUGHTS MORE FULLY WHEN HE SEES HER.
- 2. EARLIER IN THE DAY, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME HE WOULD AWAIT THE FULL TEXTS OF WHITE HOUSE STATEMENTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ON SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON BEFORE PUTTING OUT AN OFFICIAL FOREIGN MINISTRY COMMENT ON THE US/ ISRAELI AGREMENTS. QASEM SAID HE HAD TOLD A VISITING DELEGATION OF US CONGRESSMEN THAT AS THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF JORDAN, A COUNTRY WHICH HAD ALWAYS LOOKED FOR GENUINE CO-OPERATION WITH THE US AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, HE HAD NOW RUN OUT OF XCUSES TO JUSTIFY JORDAN'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. GIVEN THE STRONG JEWISH INFLUENCE IN THE MEDIA IN THE US, QASEM FORESAW THAT THE STRATEGIC AGREEMENTS WOULD GRADUALLY BECOME ACCEPTED AS PART OF US MIDDLE EAST POLICY. THIS WAS WHAT HAD HAPPENED OVER SETTLE-MENTS. ALL US PRESIDENTS UP TO CARTER HAD DENOUNCED ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AS ILLEGAL SEMI COLON NOW UNDER REAGAN THE PRESIDENTIAL POSITION HAD CHANGED, AS A RESULT OF A CONTINUOUS CAMPAIGN THROUGH THE MEDIA OVER MANY YEARS. QASEM SAID HE HAD TOLD THE AMERICAN VISITORS THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN JORDAN'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US IN THE FACE OF THE NEW AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL.
- 3. QASEM THEN READ ME SOME EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LAST LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN (SEE MY TELNO 550) AND IN PARTICULAR WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CAMP DAVID, THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND RESOLUTION 242 WHICH QASEM DESCRIBED AS 'RUBBISH'.

4. QASEM WAS QUALLY GLOOMY ON LEBANON. HE SAID THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE MNF WERE REMINISCENT OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE IN LEBANON IN THE LATE 1970S, WITH THE AMERICANS CAST IN THE SAME ROLE AS THE SYRIANS AT THAT TIME. GRADUALLY THE OTHER ARAB PARTICIPANTS HAD FELT OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE DETERRENT FORCE, BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT GO ALONG WITH SYRIAN POLICIES. 5. THE US AMBASSADOR MET WITH SIMILAR PEACTIONS WHEN HE SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 4 DECEMBER. VIETS TELLS ME THAT HE HAD WARNED THE KING REPEATEDLY OVER THE PREVIOUS THREE WEEKS OF WHAT WAS COMING. NONETHELESS, KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN ENORMOUSLY DISTRESSED, NOT BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THE WORST SCENARIO OF US/ISRAELI INTENTIONS PAINTED BY SOME ARAB COMMENTATORS BUT BECAUSE HE FELT THAT AS A RESULT OF THE US/ISRAELI AGREEMENTS IT WOULD BE ALL TOO EASY FOR THE RADICALS TO PRESENT THE US AS THE ENEMY OF THE ARABS AND BECAUSE THE KING BELIEVED THE AGREEMENT ERODED AMERICAN CAPACITY TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY IN THE AREA. HE WAS ALSO DEEPLY UPSET BECAUSE NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID DURING THE SHAMIR VISIT ABOUT WHAT THE ARABS MIGHT HOPE TO GAIN BY ENTERING THE PEACE PROCESS E.G. ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, SETTLEMENTS OR ARMS FOR JORDAN. 6. THE ONLY CRUMB OF COMFORT VIETS PERSONALLY FELT HE COULD FIND WAS THAT HE KNEW THE PRESIDENT HAD PUT SHAMIR ON NOTICE THAT, IF KING HUSSEIN WERE TO AGREE TO ENTER THE PEACE PROCESS, THE US WOULD DROP 'LIKE A TON OF BRICKS' ON ISRAEL WITHIN 24 HOURS (PLEASE PROTECT). VIETS HIMSELF IS GOING TO WASHINGTON ON 10 DECEMBER FOR CONSULTATIONS AND TO BE ON HAND FOR THE VISIT REFERRED TO IN MY TELNO 548 (NOT TO ALL). HE WILL BE RETURNING TO JORDAN VIA LONDON JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS. URWICK MIDDLE EAST ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION STANDARD DISTRIBUTION ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE NENAD SEC D MED MAED NAD ES & SD SAD ERD UND THIS TELEGRAM ESID EED CONS D CONS EM UNIT MR EGERTON WAS NOT SOV D ECD ADVANCED WED MR THOMAS RID CABINET OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL