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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 May, 1983

Dear John,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

I enclose a brief for King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister at 4.15 pm on 12 May, together with two extra copies.

The King will be accompanied by the Jordanian Ambassador, Mr Ibrahim Izzuddin. Mr Hurd will attend from here.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

King Hussein.

The P.R. wants to have a
talk with him. But I have
not yet suggested a time.

Why not try 4.45 on Wednesday?

A.S.C. 7/5.

~~Has to be Thursday
at 16.15.~~

C.S.
9.15.



10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

King Hussein will be here next week on a private visit but would like a talk with the Prime Minister. Have you any time at all?

2. He is bringing his Queen - and what about the new baby, you may ask? We parents have ways of dealing with such matters.

AJC A. & C. 5/5.
 really-----!

THU 12th

16.15 - 17.00 but you
told P.M. she has
practically no time
for her speech
G.T. - S.P. Cl.



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 12 MAY

ARAB/ISRAEL

Points to Make

1. Disappointed that PLO failed to honour agreement worked out with Arafat. PLO weak and divided, incapable of taking hard decisions. But they cannot be wished away as US sometimes suggest. Would successful withdrawal of forces from Lebanon make further Jordan/PLO negotiations worthwhile?
2. Immediate task to prevent further polarisation. Europeans can help by impressing on US that success in Lebanon, even if attained, not enough: and by encouraging Arab support for move to negotiations after a Lebanon success. What else could we be doing? Stalemate will increase Palestinian frustration and risk growing instability.
3. Israelis taking opportunity of US focus on Lebanon to redouble settlement activity. Mood in West Bank? Any evidence that support for PLO cracking?

Israel/Lebanon/Syria

4. Israel/Lebanon agreement is welcome progress. Implementation will be difficult. Major effort will be needed to persuade Syria to withdraw her forces. Dangerous period ahead in Lebanon as Syria and USSR seek to raise tension.
5. We have agreed to extend our participation in the Multinational Force (until August 1983). British contingent is playing a valuable role. Glad to hear of Jordanian help to Lebanese Government and army.

/Jordanians



Jordanians sentenced for attempted assassination of Israeli
Ambassador (if raised).

6. We have no power to transfer a person convicted of an offence in a UK court to serve his sentence in another country.



KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BRITAIN 8-14 MAY

IRAN/IRAQ

POINTS TO MAKE:

Military Situation

1. There is virtual stalemate. Latest Iranian attack achieved no territorial gains. Iranians may try again.

Mediation

2. Little action at present. Kuwaitis, with support of some GCC States, pressing for action in UN Security Council. We are anxious to help. But involvement by UN needs careful handling.

Oil Slick

3. Problem serious but greatly exaggerated by press. Still no sign of agreement to cap leaking well.

Attack on Dezful

4. Such attacks on civilian targets unlikely to help peace process.



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 4.15 PM,
12 MAY

Essential Facts

1. King Hussein, accompanied by Queen Noor, arrived in London on 8 May and is due to leave on 14 May. The visit is as usual a private one. During the visit Their Majesties will attend the wedding of the King's London based private secretary.

2. Queen Noor had a third child, Princess Inam, (her first daughter), on 24 April. The Prime Minister sent a congratulatory message.
3. Mr Pym will host a small working lunch in the King's honour on 12 May.
4. The Jordanian Ambassador who will accompany the King, was due to leave London on 5 May at the end of his appointment but is staying until after the King's departure. His next appointment is as Jordan's Ambassador in Washington.
4. Records of the King's call on the Prime Minister and his discussion with the Secretary of State in February 1983 are attached, together with the record of the Arab League visit on 18 March.

Near East and North Africa
Department

11 May 1983



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 12 MAY

ARAB/ISRAEL

Background

1. Since the breakdown of the Jordan/PLO discussions on 10 April, King Hussein has left the running to others. He intended the Jordanian Government statement to shock the PLO into new thinking. It has not yet done so. Arafat has said publicly that he wants the dialogue to continue; the PLO Executive Committee have not demurred, and some contacts continue. The Moroccans have been active in trying to narrow differences between Jordan and the PLO, but without success. The King will not give the PLO the comfort of resuming talks unless he believes they have had a change of heart. He is worried about polarisation in the region and frustrated at the lukewarm support he has received from eg Saudi Arabia (which he contrasts with the continuing generous Saudi financial support to Syria). He does not seem to have any concrete ideas on how the present stalemate can be broken.

2. US success in achieving the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon would go some way to restoring US credibility in the Arab world, and would therefore help King Hussein in persuading other Arabs to follow the American route to a Palestinian solution. But the King still has doubts about the strength of US commitment to see things through in the Middle East, particularly if they can take away a foreign policy success from Lebanon. The King pressed Shultz strongly on this point during the latter's visit to Amman on 6/7 May to explain the Israel/Lebanon agreement. Shultz said that the Americans were aware of the need to do more, particularly with the Saudis and the Palestinians. The King has dropped hints that if the US fail him, he will turn to the Russians: but he is under no illusion that they can deliver a settlement.

3. Despite their frustration with the PLO, the Jordanians have not sought to circumvent them in the peace process. The King asked Shultz to avoid public criticism of the PLO. But they remain acutely concerned at the threat to Jordan from Israeli attempts to exploit the stalemate by encouraging a movement of Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan. They see this as part of the Likud Government's policy to absorb the West Bank, and regard a number of recent Israeli moves as the start of a campaign to stimulate a further exodus; for instance the proposal to relocate UNRWA - registered refugees within the West Bank and Gaza. Jordanian officials have told us that they will shortly introduce limits on the length of stay in Jordan for travellers from the Occupied Territories. This would be intended as a clear signal to the Israelis that Jordan will oppose a solution of the Palestinian problem on Jordanian territory. To that extent, it will be supported by many Palestinians in the West Bank. But at the same time it may contribute to tension there, by underlining for West Bankers that they have nowhere else to turn.

Israel/Lebanon/Syria

4. We have not seen a full text of the Israel/Lebanon agreement. The Americans are working to resolve further clarifications and amendments sought by Israel. The agreement is likely to be signed next week, but will then have to be ratified by the Lebanese Parliament.

5. The main elements of the agreement provide for:

(a) An end to the state of war, and implicit recognition (but no diplomatic relations) between Israel and Lebanon.

(b) Two security zones in Southern Lebanon. Major Haddad will be Deputy Commander of the Southern brigade in charge of intelligence and anti-terrorism;

(c) Up to 8 Israeli-Lebanese teams of 20 men will be allowed to patrol in the security zones (and by sea and air) but will be under Lebanese Army control;

/(d)



(d) Limited movement of goods and people. Israeli exports to Lebanon to exclude products made and exported by Lebanon. Trade to be reviewed as part of negotiations on normal relations after six months;

(e) UNIFIL to be moved north to Sidon, to assist the Lebanese Army in protecting Palestinian refugee camps in the area (subject to UN Security Council agreement to rewrite the mandate).

6. Issues omitted from the agreement include Israeli air surveillance (which will continue) and hot pursuit of terrorists. In return for the agreement Israel can expect renewed supplies of US F-16 aircraft and reactivation of the strategic cooperation memorandum, and possibly other US promises.

7. Syria has rejected the agreement as an infringement of Lebanese sovereignty and (with more justification) of Syria's security and has called for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal (in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 509). But the United States is taking some comfort in the fact that President Asad has not totally rejected the idea of Syrian withdrawal. They hope that if the Lebanese Parliament approves the agreement, Syria may allow herself to be persuaded to withdraw provided her own security concerns are met (eg a security zone on Lebanon's eastern border) and perhaps if increased Saudi aid^{is} offered as an incentive.

8. Soviet reaction to the agreement has been notably hostile. The USSR has tried to keep the temperature up by new accusations of Israeli military preparations and by giving unusual publicity to the departure of Soviet personnel from Beirut. There are some 6000 (US estimate) Soviet advisers in Syria at present.

9. King Hussein supports Lebanese efforts to get rid of foreign forces and has sent his Foreign Minister to Beirut as a gesture of solidarity of the Lebanese Government. Jordan is also providing tanks for the Lebanese army. But the King has remained silent on the Agreement.

10. The security situation in the Beirut area has deteriorated in the last two weeks with renewed fighting between Christian and Druze (Muslim) militias and indiscriminate shelling of Beirut suburbs. There has also been some limited reinforcement of Syrian, PLO and Israeli forces recently. There is no evidence that Syria or Israel is preparing to renew major hostilities, although the risk of an outbreak of fighting remains. The Israelis appear willing to give Syria some weeks to fall into line. But failing this and assuming continuing Israeli casualties, the Israeli Government will be under pressure to agree to partial withdrawal of Israeli forces into Southern Lebanon. The likely result of this would be greater interfactional fighting in the Beirut area and greater hazards for the Multinational Force.

Jordanians sentenced for attempted assassination of Mr Argov

11. The three men found guilty of the attempted assassination in London last June of Mr Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador, have Jordanian nationality. King Hussein may ask that they are allowed to serve their sentences in Jordan.

12. There is no legislation which allows a person convicted in a British court to serve their sentence in another country. A Council of Europe convention to allow prisoners to be transferred to serve their sentences in their European countries of origin is now under study by Ministers. Other countries may be allowed to join subject to the agreement of all participating states.

Near East and North Africa Department
11 May 1983

IRAN/IRAQBACKGROUND :Military Situation

1. The latest Iranian attack in April has not altered the military balance. All fighting took place on Iranian territory, Iran made no territorial gains. The Iraqis able to contain this level of Iranian attack but are increasingly concerned at the cost in casualties. Iraq lost a disproportionate number of officers in the April fighting.


Mediation

2. Regular mediators such as the Algerians, remain inactive. Kuwait and the Gulf States are urging the UN Secretary-General to bring the matter before the Security Council with the objective of seeking to impose a settlement. We do not believe that such a move will lead to a peaceful settlement. The Iranians are unlikely to respond to further Security Council resolutions. The Secretary-General still has some influence with the Iranians and when the time is right an initiative by him may lead to progress.

Oil Slick

3. Such reports as we have suggest that the threat posed by the oil slick has been exaggerated by the press. Much of the oil is breaking up and is unlikely to threaten the Gulf States in the short-term. There is still no sign of an agreement between the two parties to cap the leaking well. The Iraqis are the problem in this case. DOT's Marine Pollution Control and BP have offered to provide assistance, through Saudi Arabia, to undertake necessary repair work.

/Attack



Attack on Dezful

4. In April the Iraqis launched several ground-to-ground missiles against the Iranian town of Dezful. There are differing reports of casualties but it seems clear that civilian casualties were high. The Iranians have protested to the United Nations and the European Community.