

PRIME MINISTER'S DAY

After spending most of the morning in No 10 the Prime Minister is travelling to Paris for the Reagan bilateral and the Versailles Summit.

ODSA

At 9.15am the PM chaired a meeting of the group of Ministers concerned with the Falklands (Home Sec., Foreign Sec., S/S Defence, Chancellor of the Duchy, Attorney General, CDS). Meeting broke up at 10.30am.

VERSAILLES SUMMIT

The Prime Minister left No 10 at 10.45am for Northolt and Orly. At 3.00pm (local time) she will meet President Reagan at the US Embassy and will then travel by helicopter to Versailles, arriving at about 5.30pm (local) to be greeted by President Mitterrand. The PM will return to No 10 from the Summit on Sunday night.

WHITE PAPER LIST

Distributed.

RAYNER - ENERGY CONSERVATION

At 12 noon D/En will issue a Press Notice about the Rayner Study on Energy Conservation which is now under way. The PN will give the terms of reference.

FALKLANDS

We did not think the Group of Ministers concerned with the Falklands would meet in the PM's absence at Versailles, pointing out that Mr Pym would be at the Summit too. Asked if the PM would return from France early if there was an attack on Port Stanley, we said this should not necessarily be assumed. Obviously the PM would be reluctant to leave the Summit but it would depend on the situation.

Asked if the letter to Menendez indicated a pause in Falklands action and perhaps implied he was being given 48 hours, we emphasised again that there was no timetable implied. Menendez and the Argentines had the opportunity to arrange for a ceasefire and their withdrawal. This had always been so. The note to Menendez placed this on record.

We confirmed that the morning's meeting of Ministers would have dealt with the diplomatic moves at the UN and the question of what might be acceptable to the British. Spain and Panama had put forward a resolution. This had been withdrawn when it became clear that they would not get the necessary 9 votes. Some amendments had now been made and the Security Council would meet at 8.00pm overtime. We emphasised that the essential point about a ceasefire from the British point of view was a guarantee of Argentine withdrawal. We would want something explicit on this point.

On the question of resolutions 502 and 505 we reminded the lobby that 505 was largely a re-statement of 502 and called for the Secretary General to use his good offices to bring about a negotiated ceasefire. This he had not been able to do. We could not accept a ceasefire which would enable further Argentine procrastination of which we had seen many examples over the preceding weeks. The agreement had to be watertight.

We repeatedly denied any delay in military action.

On the question of the Vulcan landing in Brazil we confirmed that this aircraft had been engaged in maritime reconnaissance.