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NOT RECORDED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: <sup>MAY 12</sup> <sup>A 9:19</sup> THE PRESIDENT

FROM : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony. In my testimony today before the Committee on arms control policy, the members were extremely interested in the details and numbers contained in your proposal. I said that we did not want to state a detailed outline in public session but we would provide an executive session briefing on warhead numbers. There was also considerable discussion of the SALT II Treaty. I emphasized that essentially, SALT II had been rejected by the Senate. We had informed the Soviets that the treaty was dead and they understood and accepted our position. Rather than getting into a protracted debate on SALT II, I argued that we should work towards building a new national consensus in support of your proposal. (U)

2. Israeli Military Buildup. Israel has begun a major strengthening of its forces on its northern border. We believe, however, that no decision has been taken to move into Lebanon. The Cabinet may be seeking to mollify Sharon by authorizing a buildup so that, in the event of another cease-fire violation, the PLO could be attacked rapidly. The Israelis appear perplexed about what to do. They feel that the PLO's ability to control the situation is diminishing; another serious cease-fire violation may be inevitable. But many in the Cabinet also believe that a major Israeli assault into Lebanon could be disastrous. Ambassador Lewis says that Begin and the Israeli leadership are fully aware of our view that the cease-fire must be maintained. Larry Eagleburger reinforced our view today in a long, remarkably friendly yet frank meeting with Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Ben-Meir. Speaking on my behalf, Eagleburger said that all we are seeking to do together in autonomy and other key issues could be jeopardized if not ruined by widespread conflict in Lebanon. Ben-Meir said he could cable our message immediately to Begin and Shamir, and reiterate it when he returns to Israel on Friday. (S)

3. The OECD Ministerial and Shultz's Meeting with Mitterrand. The May 10-11 OECD Ministerial will be helpful in paving the way for achieving your goals at Versailles. Although there were a number of areas of disagreement, particularly involving high U.S. interest rates, the Ministers showed a desire to avoid confrontation and to achieve as much consensus as possible. The final communique emphasized the importance of non-inflationary growth and avoided direct criticism of U.S. economic policy. Meanwhile, George Shultz reports that he had a lengthy (almost 2 hours) and quite exciting meeting with Mitterrand this morning. Mitterrand is showing great inner security and confidence; his personal popularity is higher than when he took office. He wants Versailles to give the Soviets an unmistakable impression of Western unity and strength and he will therefore want to avoid public confrontation at the Summit. Shultz feels there may be some common ground between the French and us in emphasizing growth through investment, productivity and technology to lower costs and lower inflation. You will want to discuss this further with George on Saturday. (C)

RDS 2/3 5/11/02 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

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MEMORANDUM

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The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CC 2/22/07

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

May 12, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

PC

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Attached is Secretary Haig's Evening Report for May 11,  
1982.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Michael Deaver

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