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
FM BUENOS AIRES 25/2¢#4Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 103 OF 25 MARCH 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE FORT STANLEY (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR), MODUK NAVY AND
CINCFLEET

MY TELNO 101: SOUTH GEORGIA

1. FURTHER THOUGHT SUGGESTS FOUR OTHER POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES (ALL FAIRLY UNSATISFACTORY) BEYOND THAT MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TUR. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH ANYONE.



- 3. THE SECOND WOULD BE TO USE THE MARINES ON LAND TO EXPEL THE WORKMEN FROM THE SITE AND TO LEAVE THEM EG ENCAMPED ON THE BEACH. THEY WOULD THEN HAVE NO INCENTIVE TO STAY AND MIGHT SPONTANEOUSLY EMBARK ON PARAISO.
- 4. THE THIRD IS FOR US OURSELVES TO STRIKE A BARGAIN WITH DAVIDOFF THAT, IF HE NOW WITHDRAWS HIS MEN SPONTANEOUSLY, HE CAN BRING THEM BACK, GOING PROPERLY THROUGH GRYTVIKEN. LATER AND COMPLETE HIS CONTRACT. THIS OBVIOUSLY INVOLVES MORE CONCESSION, BUT IS LESS RISKY. WE MUST ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT DAVIDOFF MAY WELL HAVE A CASE IN LAW FOR DAMAGES AGAINST FIG OR HMG IF HIS CONTRACT IS NULLIFIED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS.
- 5. THE FOURTH ALTERNATIVE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE TO SUGGEST THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS INVOKE THE GOOD OFFICES OF A THIRD, EG THE UNITED STATES. I CANNOT SEE ANY OF THE THREE BEING GREATLY ENTHUSED SEMI COLON BUT IT MIGHT BE BETTER THAN AN ARMED CLASH.

WILLIAMS

STANDARD SAMD CABINET OFFICE ADDITIONAL DISTN FALKLAND ISLANDS

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