SECRET 5
November 30, 1981

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT


From

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

- 1. Sinai MFO. Ambassador Evron presented me this evening with some minor revisions to the draft U.S.-Israeli declaration which Foreign Minister Shamir took back Friday for Israeli Cabinet approval. We quickly agreed on a final text which will permit Israel to accept European participation in the Sinai peacekeeping force. The joint announcement could be made as early as Tuesday to be followed by letters from Shamir to the four concerned European states officially notifying them of Israel's acceptance. This breakthrough allows the formation of a very credible international force consisting of contingents from the U.S., Britain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Fiji, Uruguay, Colombia, Australia and New Zealand. (C)
- 2. Sakharov Hunger Strike. Andrei Sakharov and his wife have vowed to continue their hunger strike, now in its ninth day, despite Sakharov's heart condition, until Soviet authorities agree to allow their daughter-in-law to join her husband in the United States. We have become increasingly concerned about the hunger strike. Last Friday Walt Stoessel raised the matter on my instructions with the Soviets here. Unless someone relents soon, we could be facing a real tragedy. I will keep you advised. (SECRET/NODIS)
- 3. Greeks Delay Spanish Entry Into NATO. The new Greek Government informed NATO today that it could not agree to NATO's plan to respond positively on Tuesday to Spain's request for an invitation to join the alliance. We cannot wait for the Greeks to clarify their position at the NATO Ministerial Meeting on December 10 without very serious complications for Spain's pro-NATO Government. I have sent an urgent message to all of the other alliance foreign ministers and to the Spanish asking them to join us in making a strong demarche to the Greeks to try to reverse their position. (S)
- 4. Aftermath of the Fez Arab Summit. The Arab Summit at Fez was adjourned abruptly by the moderates once they saw that the radicals could not be brought to accept even the implied recognition of Israel contained in Fahd's eight points. The moderates are trying to portray this as something of a victory; they avoided a stampede into dead-end positions. Arafat tried to remain in the middle. His unwillingness to support Fahd's plan doomed its prospects at the Summit but his reluctance to join the rejectionists probably forced Syria's Assad not to come to Fez. The next summit is some months off. We can expect the moderate Arabs to pressure us for further, positive comments about the Fahd plan for the next round. (S)

RDS 2/3 11/30/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)





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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET ATTACHMENT

December 1, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JAMES W. NANCE

SUBJECT:

Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Attached is Al Haig's Evening Report for November 30, 1981.

cc: The Vice President

Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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SECRET ATTACHMENT