



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 June 1981

*Dear Michael,*

Call by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia  
11.00 am on 12 June

Mr Street is visiting the UK at Lord Carrington's suggestion. They will have detailed discussions on a wide range of issues, immediately after Mr Street's call on the Prime Minister.

Bilateral relations are of course excellent. Mr Street is likely to be pre-occupied with the Melbourne CHGM; he will be keen to discuss arrangements, including the agenda: it will be useful to learn his views. (Brief attached.) On sporting issues, we hope that any discussions in Melbourne on the Gleneagles agreement can be informal; and we will support Australia's attempts to minimise possible danger to the 1982 Brisbane Games. (Brief attached.)

I also attach copies of briefs on 'North-South' matters, East-West relations, South-East Asia (and refugee problems in that area), EC issues, and Defence questions, in case Mr Street raises these subjects.

Lastly, I attach a copy of our Personality Report on Mr Street, a copy of his programme, a copy of a telegram from Sir J Mason in Canberra setting the scene for the visit.

*yours na*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street



VISIT OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA 10-14 JUNE  
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)

POINTS TO MAKE

GENERAL

1. Prime Minister/Secretary of State both look forward keenly to being present. Share Australia's concern that it should be a success. It will be a relief to have a CHGM no longer dominated by the Rhodesia problem; and we hope this year's will see a better balance.

UK VIEWS ON CHGM AGENDA

2. Commonwealth Secretary General's suggestions only just received (in recent circular letter); but on expected lines. North/South issues and Southern African matters (see separate briefs) will obviously receive particular attention. Have not at this stage decided whether we shall be putting forward any new suggestions for agenda; but important to take account of (especially) Pacific view that, with Rhodesian problem solved, CHGM series should give more time to subjects of greater interest to non-African countries. In any case, worth encouraging Pacific voices.

POSSIBLE UK INITIATIVES (IF RAISED)

3. Early days yet and nothing concrete in mind, but looking at one or two ideas. Major problem is lack of funds for any new projects at a period when we are having to make substantial cuts in all government budgets.

AUSTRALIAN INITIATIVES?

4. Know you are considering eg initiative on NWICO. Anything else? (Within framework of our financial constraints) can we help?

PAKISTAN'S POSSIBLE READMISSION TO COMMONWEALTH

5. Understand Mr Street once considered possibility of an initiative at CHGM to promote Pakistan's readmission. Is this finally dropped? Given strength of Indian views, anything more than discussion in CHGM corridors at present seems impractical.

## ● ESSENTIAL FACTS

GENERAL

1. Australian Government is sending delegations (led by Ministers or backbenchers) to all Commonwealth countries attending this year's Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM: 30 September - 7 October: in Melbourne, with weekend retreat in Canberra). Commonwealth Secretary-General has said their aim, which he supports, is to solicit views rather than promote specific positions. However press reports (confirmed by Australian High Commission) indicate that emissaries may convey letter inviting heads of Government to CHGM and including suggestions on latter's agenda.
2. Though his visit originated at Secretary of State's invitation Mr Street has taken on this CHGM role in respect of UK.
3. PCD reconnaissance mission in late April/May and visit to London 4 - 9 June by head of the Australian CHGM Task Force, confirm that Australians have arrangements for CHGM well in hand.

UK VIEWS ON CHGM AGENDA

4. Mr Ramphal's (circular) letter (of 27 May: copy annexed) not yet considered fully. Proposals seem unexceptionable, drawing particular attention to: current political tensions, including Southern Africa; North/South issues; and Commonwealth functional co-operation. On latter, major UK problem is lack of funds; difficult to endorse any proposal, of which there are a number foreshadowed in Mr Ramphal's letter, which would result in increased UK expenditure (we contribute to Commonwealth organisations, including Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation)(CFTC) at flat rate of 30%). Examples : increased subscriptions to CFTC, Commonwealth Foundation, Commonwealth Youth Programme; additional Secretariat responsibilities for Human Rights, "student mobility", Commonwealth Arts, media.

POSSIBLE UK INITIATIVES

5. Toying with several ideas, on eg NWICO and Namibia (see separate briefs).

AUSTRALIAN INITIATIVES

6. (See separate briefs on NWICO and North/South). Mr Fraser keen to make CHGM a success and known to be considering several major initiatives, of varying substance.

PAKISTAN'S POSSIBLE READMISSION TO COMMONWEALTH

7. Australians earlier this year took soundings in all Commonwealth capitals, discerning general, albeit lukewarm, support for Pakistan's readmission. Mr Street subsequently reported to have recommended to Mr Fraser (who had been personally keen to see movement before or at CHGM) that pitfalls outweighed possible advantages and matter should not be taken further. Mrs Gandhi's face set firmly against Pakistani readmission. UK commercial interests in India demand caution and it would be unwise for us at present to take (or obviously support) any initiative.

OTHER CHGM ISSUES

8. See the separate briefing on sporting contacts, North/South matters, NWICO and African issues (for Namibia).


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~~TREAT AS  
CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~Covering SECRET~~

C.152/11/4

27 May 1981

I attach a message to your Head of Government on the subject of the agenda for the next Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Melbourne from 30 September to 7 October 1981 together with an extra copy. I should be grateful if you would ensure that this is transmitted to your Head of Government as quickly as possible.



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Shridath S Ramphal

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Treat as  
CONFIDENTIAL  
~~SECRET~~

C.152/11/4

27 May 1981

As preparations enter their final phase for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Melbourne from 30 September to 7 October 1981, I write to seek your views on the subjects which you would like to see discussed and to offer some preliminary ideas for your consideration.

I do so against a background in which the Commonwealth's established capacity for consensus building is perhaps more widely recognised and valued than ever before - and not just by member Governments but by the international community as a whole. Significantly, Melbourne will be the first major consultation at the highest level of 'North' and 'South' anywhere in the world since Lusaka. The challenge to the Commonwealth to improve the prospects for global harmony through its unique facility for direct and informal discussion between Heads of Government could hardly be more pointed than at this moment of acute difficulty for many countries and with the larger crises of the '80s looming ahead. In responding to that challenge, Heads of Government will, I am sure, be reinforced by recollections of the achievements of Lusaka and of Commonwealth roles since then.

On the political front it clearly is a time of unusual danger. The decline of detente, the acceleration of the arms race, the hardening of the policies of the superpowers across the board, the persistence of such areas of tension as Afghanistan and Kampuchea and the emergence of new flashpoints cannot but be matters of grave concern.

...2/.

And, as the set-back to the SALT process and the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea illustrate, there is the danger of an unravelling process which could further aggravate political tensions and difficulties. Some Commonwealth countries feel directly affected by particular situations, but a worsening of the political climate and threats to peace affect all nations. Heads of Government will no doubt wish to consider these developments in their review of the world political situation while recognising that, in a world in which issues become ever more closely inter-linked, they are not without relevance for development and international economic co-operation generally.

Zimbabwe's independence after long years of travail was a source of particular pride and satisfaction to the Commonwealth. Its presence at Melbourne will be a reminder of the unfinished business of Southern Africa. After years of patient negotiation, Namibia's progress to independence and Commonwealth membership has now suffered a major set-back; while much will obviously depend on events over the next few months, the situation inevitably occasions grave concern. Within South Africa, apartheid continues to constitute an affront to the world community, undermining the prospects for peace and stability of the entire region. Recalling the Lusaka Declaration on Racism and Racial Prejudice, and the earlier and more particular Gleneagles Agreement, Heads of Government will, I am sure, wish to consider urgent ways and means of shaping events towards internationally agreed objectives. And a similar wish will certainly obtain in relation to the situation in Cyprus which has continued to defy resolution.

On the economic side, I am keenly aware of the opportunity which the Melbourne Meeting presents to focus upon the crisis which affects the world economy in general and the developing countries in particular and to consider what measures Commonwealth countries, individually and collectively, might take in the context of broader international action to help improve the situation. The timing of the Melbourne discussions - after the Ottawa Summit of the major industrialised nations (in July) and prior to the summit of world leaders of both industrialised and developing countries in Mexico (later in October) - invests Melbourne with added significance.

Since Heads of Government last met in Lusaka two years ago, the international economic situation has unquestionably deteriorated, manifesting itself in massive economic problems and enlarging poverty and instability in the developing 'South' and rising unemployment and falling output in the industrialised 'North'. At such a time when the need for sustained action at the global level has never been greater, individual Governments are tending to turn

inwards, and negotiations on the form and substance of that action remain painfully deadlocked.

At Lusaka, Heads of Government agreed on a study by an independent group of experts with a view to identifying specific measures to reduce or eliminate as a matter of urgency constraints on structural change and economic growth in both developed and developing countries. The Report of the Expert Group led by Professor Arndt of Australia ('The World Economic Crisis'), was circulated to the 11th Special Session of the United Nations last year and has received much attention. With appropriate updating, which the Secretariat will provide, the Report provides an eminently suitable starting point for the discussions at Melbourne. In the context of prevailing conditions in the world economy, food, energy, trade and financial flows would seem to emerge as critical issues for attention.

As in the past, the Commonwealth, by virtue of its special capacity to view the world situation from both North and South can lend a much needed impetus to the processes of global negotiation. By helping to point the way forward, Commonwealth leaders can contribute to progress at the Mexico Summit and in the 'Global Round'. I would welcome your thoughts on how Melbourne might best serve these purposes.

Finally, there is the important area of functional co-operation. The Commonwealth's capacity to contribute to wider global issues is of course rooted in and sustained by practical co-operation between Commonwealth countries themselves. Past Heads of Government meetings have successively enlarged the scope of such endeavours particularly in the field of development. It was in this spirit that Lusaka initiated a programme of industrial co-operation and already gratifying progress has been made in initiating new industrial projects in a number of countries. In this vein and responsive to current needs, I venture to suggest a few areas of special emphasis at Melbourne. These involve, in the main, not the initiation of new programmes but the strengthening of existing ones:

- I have mentioned 'food' as one of the global issues to which Heads of Government might pay particular attention. I know it is high among the concerns of many leaders. There may well be important practical ways in which the Commonwealth can respond to these concerns and the needs they reflect. Enhanced co-operation in food production in particular can be of immense value to many Commonwealth countries facing serious food deficits and the prospect of major global food shortages. At their recent meeting in Dacca, Commonwealth Agricultural Ministers urged an enlarged Commonwealth role in



this area including measures to harness Commonwealth experience and skills in a manner that could yield practical results. I propose, therefore, to submit for consideration some specific proposals in this respect.

- Heads of Government of the Asia-Pacific region held their second meeting in September 1980 in New Delhi and the evolution of this important regional initiative will be of interest to the Commonwealth as a whole, as will other efforts at regional co-operation involving Commonwealth countries - one of which, the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) emerged since Lusaka.
- Lusaka gave emphasis to special programmes of assistance to our island developing and specially disadvantaged member countries, a theme which was pursued further at the regional meeting in New Delhi. Commonwealth work in this area has been essentially pioneering and it requires reinforcement. It would be particularly helpful to consider how bilateral and multilateral programmes may be strengthened and given greater momentum, responsive to the wishes of the countries concerned.

There will be need, too, to review or carry forward a number of specific decisions that were taken at Lusaka or at subsequent Ministerial Meetings:

- Heads of Government will have before them the Report of the Working Party on Human Rights which seeks to respond to its mandate in this important but sensitive area.
- Heads of Government will also have before them a Report of the Commonwealth Committee on Communication and the Media as well as a Report on the proposal for a Commonwealth Film and Television Institute.
- The ongoing work and resource problems of the Commonwealth Youth Programme and the Commonwealth Foundation will require close attention if they are to continue to fulfil the purposes for which they were established.

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At their meeting in Sri Lanka in August 1980, Commonwealth Education Ministers requested me to convene a Consultative Group to examine ways in which student mobility between Commonwealth countries could be maintained and fostered. The Group's recommendations are now before Education Ministers but in view of the urgency and importance of the matter, Heads of Government may wish to give some attention to it at Melbourne.

Underpinning all these activities, and indeed the Secretariat's entire operational capability in the field of development, is the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation. Despite impressive achievements, it is a matter of major concern that the last two years have seen a decline in real terms in the Fund's resources and a corresponding diminution in its capacity to meet the needs of member countries. That this should have happened during a period of sustained Commonwealth achievement on the world stage is all the more disquieting. I very much hope that at Melbourne Heads of Government will attach importance to reversing this trend and will consider favourably the Report of the Working Party on CFTC Resources set up by Finance Ministers last September. I cannot emphasise too strongly the intimate link between the fortunes of the Fund and the elan of the Commonwealth connection, which will be weakened if the Fund declines. The amounts involved are relatively small but the returns are of disproportionate value and significance. For the major contributors to the Fund it is much less a question of additional resources than of priorities within existing development assistance programmes. Melbourne will offer an opportunity to respond in priority terms to what the Commonwealth relationship both needs and deserves.

Separately, a more general question has been raised about the possibility of greater co-operation in the cultural sphere. The Commonwealth Institute hopes Heads of Government will take note of its work and consider ways in which it could be of greater service to Governments; and the recently formed Commonwealth Arts Organisation seeks official support. I would welcome your guidance.

As I indicated earlier, these are preliminary thoughts on the broad contents of the agenda, based on my assessment of the current concerns of Commonwealth Governments. I assume Heads of Government will wish the agenda's actual format to follow the successful pattern of recent Meetings, with broad and flexible headings under which specific topics can be inscribed.

SECRET

I shall be grateful to have your views, if possible by mid-July, along with an indication whether it will be your intention to present any papers to the Meeting. In the light of the responses I receive, I hope to be able to circulate an annotated draft agenda in the first week of August.

Meanwhile, having just returned from Canberra, I am glad to be able to report to you on the excellence of the arrangements for the Meeting, and how much effort and care the Australian Government has devoted to them. You are assured of a warm welcome and of facilities designed to make your consultations as productive as possible.

With deep respect,

Shridath S Ramphal

VISIT OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA: 10-14 JUNE 1981  
BRIEF NO : GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT: SPORTING CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA  
POINTS TO MAKE

Renegotiation of Gleneagles Agreement: Commonwealth Heads of  
Government Meeting

1. Gleneagles Agreement certain to be discussed at Melbourne. Sonny Ramphal seems relaxed, but understand Nigerians and Abraham Ordia may be seeking to tighten it. Want to avoid modification. Hope it can be discussed informally and acrimonious debate avoided.

2. We already discourage sporting contacts. But our sportsmen and sports bodies are independent. We cannot stop them visiting South Africa or any other country, as witness the Moscow Olympics.

United Nations Blacklist

3. Every country has a right to refuse entry to non-nationals. But our own traditions of individual freedom lead us to deplore a blacklist of this nature. It is not binding. We shall not apply it though others will. Too early to know how it will work out.

Commonwealth Games, Brisbane, 1982

4. Illogical and unjust to boycott Commonwealth Games in response to ill-considered actions by one group of sportsmen whose sport, rugby, will not even be represented at Brisbane. We will do what we can to minimise damage to Games.

Irish Rugby Football Union (IRFU) Tour of South Africa

5. Did all we could. Supported Irish Government's efforts. Our Minister for Sport wrote to President of IRFU advising Union to reconsider and to advise potential participants from Northern Ireland of our concern.

Springbok Tour of New Zealand

6. If the tour goes ahead the Brisbane Games may be adversely affected. But we are in no position to urge the New Zealand Government to keep the Springboks out: our own Immigration Rules do not allow refusal of entry solely because of participation in sporting events.

/Initiative

Initiative by South African Government to relax Apartheid in Sport

7. We welcome any move by South Africa to normalise sport. But it will not soften African attitudes: they want the abolition of Apartheid in general, not just in sport.

Cultural Relations Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
8 June 1981

VISIT OF MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA: 10-14 JUNE 1981

GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT: SPORTING CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Renegotiation of Gleneagles Agreement: Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)

1. Recent actions by the Nigerian and Guyanese authorities have focussed attention on the Gleneagles Agreement and raised questions about its interpretation. Four Caribbean Governments have already indicated their intention of raising Agreement at CHOGM with a view to securing its more effective implementation. It would be unrealistic to expect support for a move to relax it. It may be difficult to prevent it being discussed in open session rather than at the informal weekend, which is what we would prefer.

United Nations Blacklist

2. On 15 May 1981 the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid published a Report which includes a "register" covering the period 1 September 1980 to 31 March 1981. The Register contains three lists:-

- (i) A list of sports exchanges with South Africa;
- (ii) A list of sportsmen and women who participated in sports events in South Africa;
- (iii) A list of promoters and administrators who have been active in collaboration with 'apartheid sport'.

3. Britons feature prominently throughout and the Sports Council Chairman (Mr Richard Jeeps) together with one other member (Mr Bill Hick) are included in the third section of the register.

Commonwealth Games, Brisbane, 30 September to 10 October 1982

4. If the Springbok tour of New Zealand takes place there could be an African boycott of the Brisbane Games, unless the New Zealanders stay away. But a recent visit to Australia by Mr Abraham Ordia, the President of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa went very well. The Australians handled the visit skilfully and Mr Ordia did not close the door completely on a compromise. During his visit he praised Mr Fraser and Australia for their support in the battle against apartheid in sport. The Australians, as hosts, are particularly anxious that there should be no disruptions.

/Irish

Irish Rugby Football Union (IRFU) Tour of South Africa

5. The IRFU decided on 2 January to undertake a short tour of South Africa in May. The Union is responsible for rugby for the whole of Ireland and it was inevitable that some Northern Ireland players would be selected. Both we and the Irish Government made every effort to persuade IRFU to call off the tour but it went ahead as planned. Most critical comment has been directed towards the Republic, but they have also been praised for the strength of their attempts at discouragement.

Springbok Tour of New Zealand

6. The New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) have invited a South African rugby team (Springboks) to tour New Zealand during July/September 1981. Despite intense pressure within New Zealand from church leaders, trade unionists and both major political parties the NZRFU have remained adamant that the tour will take place. The New Zealand Government are now most sensitive on this issue but have refused to withhold visas from the Springboks. The issue has become an irritant in bilateral relations between Australia and New Zealand.

7. A planned visit by Mr Street to New Zealand was cancelled after reports had appeared in the press claiming that the purpose of the visit was to persuade the New Zealand Government to prevent the tour. Given our own policy towards sporting contacts with South Africa we are not in a position to urge the New Zealand Government to do more.

Initiative by South African Government to relax Apartheid in Sport

8. Dr Viljoen, Minister of National Education, stated on 22 May 1981, that the South African Government had decided in principle to amend certain apartheid legislation so as to exclude sport. This would take time. But it was hoped the decisions would confirm both in South Africa and abroad that the Government regarded multiracial sport and the removal of obstructive measures as a matter of concern.

9. We welcome the proposed changes as a step in the right direction. But our policy will remain unaltered resting as it does on 'Gleneagles'. A majority of Commonwealth governments will continue to take the view that "normal sport is impossible in an abnormal society".

/Trawl

Trawl by our High Commissions on likely attitude to CHGM Melbourne

10. We have asked our posts to ascertain discreetly the views of Commonwealth governments on discussion of the Gleneagles Agreement at Melbourne. We are sharing the results with New Zealand and have offered, through the High Commission in Canberra, to share them also with Australia. [Summary of replies received so far is attached at A.] Mr Street's visit is part of a series of consultations the Australians are conducting to take the views of Commonwealth colleagues about the CHGM.

Future British Sporting Contacts with South Africa

11. There is only one definite rugby contact expected in the foreseeable future: the Welsh Academicals are intending to tour South Africa for three weeks in late July/August 1981. Mr Monro has written discouragingly to the President of the Welsh Rugby Union but it seems that the tour will go ahead.

Cultural Relations Department

8 June 1981



TRAWL OF LIKELY ATTITUDE TO DISCUSSION OF GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT AT CHGMANTIGUA

Will push for agreement on third party principle, ie to act against a non-national for his having had sporting contacts with South Africa.

BARBADOS

Will push for agreement on third party principle.

BANGLADESH

Expected to support any move to strengthen Agreement.

BOTSWANA

No strong views. Unlikely to oppose wishes of fellow Africans.

CANADA

Unenthusiastic, but believes discussion inevitable. A moderating influence.

DOMINICA

Prime Minister in favour of multiracial teams visiting South Africa. Will not favour strengthening of Agreement, but unlikely to be vocal or influential.

FIJI

Prime Minister favours informal discussion and weakening of Agreement.

GUYANA

Bound to press for strengthening of Agreement.

INDIA

Expects pressure to strengthen Agreement and would feel bound to support it.

JAMAICA

Feels committed to press for agreement on third party principle.

KENYA

Attitude will be affected by any resolutions adapted by OAU summit, Nairobi in June.

LESOTHO

Unlikely to oppose wishes of fellow Africans.

MALAYSIA

Unlikely to take particularly strong line but forthcoming elections could affect policy.

MAURITIUS

Unenthusiastic. Will not want text of Agreement altered.

MONTSERRAT

Will push for agreement on third party principle.

NIGERIA

Will press for strengthening of Agreement. Expected to produce new draft agreement for consideration.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Prime Minister sees no reason to discuss Agreement. But if inevitable hopes it will be informal.

SEYCHELLES

Likely to be influenced by countries like Tanzania.

SINGAPORE

Does not believe Agreement should be strengthened but would not support UK stance.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Unenthusiastic but would feel obliged to make ritual gesture if Agreement discussed.

SWAZILAND

Expected to support any move to strengthen Agreement.

TANZANIA

Would follow any agreed African line to strengthen Agreement.

TONGA

Would only support strengthening of Agreement if freedom of movement not jeopardised. Moderating influence.

TRINIDAD

Expected to support moves to strengthen Agreement.

VANUATU

Unenthusiastic. Would not approve of discrimination against individuals (Blacklisting).

ZAMBIA

Would support fellow Africans seeking to strengthen Agreement.



VISIT OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA, 10-14 JUNE 1981  
NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Content that North/South issues should be an important theme at CHOGM.
2. Hope for informal discussion leading to a meeting of minds.
3. Do the Australians have any particular initiatives in mind?
4. How do they see the outcome at Melbourne on North/South matters?
5. (If necessary) We do not think it would be right to nag the Americans about a commitment to the Global Negotiations in advance of Cancún.
6. (Defensive) Spoken recently to Mexican and Austrian representatives. They indicated that attendance at Cancún was now settled. But if question should be re-opened, we would regard Australia as a strong candidate.



## BACKGROUND

1. Mr Fraser has agreed with the Commonwealth Secretary-General that North/South should figure prominently in Melbourne (other major areas of concern will include 'escalation of the arms race, decline of detente and developments in Africa'). He is sending emissaries to all the CHOGM countries to 'solicit views'; Mr Street's visit is, in part, for this purpose. (In addition, two of Mr Fraser's personal advisers will visit London for discussion with officials in July).
2. Mr Fraser has a well-publicised commitment to the North/South Dialogue, based partly on personal conviction and partly on the special interests of Australia as a major commodity producer with a relatively undeveloped industrial base. He wrote to the Prime Minister in February describing the CHOGM as 'an invaluable opportunity to foster a pragmatic and co-operative approach to the Dialogue'.
3. Mr Fraser is subject to domestic criticism that his progressive protestations are not matched by actions. He is accordingly seeking 'bold initiatives' to be launched at Melbourne. The sidelined passages in paras 4-7 below are based upon information given to us in strict confidence, and are not for use.
4. In international fora Australia tends to distance herself from the majority of OECD countries on the issue of agricultural protectionism, where she is very critical of the CAP. She is herself vulnerable to criticism, especially from ASEAN countries, of her relatively high tariffs on industrial goods. But we understand that Mr Fraser has commissioned officials to begin work on ways of reducing Australian protectionism, despite the



political storm that any such move would cause within the Government coalition. In the commodities field also, Australian interests as a major producer often diverge from our own.

5. The Australians - like HMG - have accepted the UN official development assistance target of 0.7% of GNP, without commitment to any timeframe. The Fraser Administration is committed to reductions in public expenditure, and the volume of Australian ODA has recently been declining. At the end of May, however, the Australian Cabinet endorsed a call for a 'substantial real increase' in ODA. Departments apparently believe that a real increase of 6-8% will be announced at CHOGM.

6. As a major food producer, Australia is likely to welcome any North/South initiative in the field of agricultural development and food aid.

7. Mr Fraser is working on a 'Melbourne Declaration' (draft at Annex A). It is an example of the sort of forward rhetoric that we find unhelpful. But Mr Fraser is apparently not concerned about the Prime Minister's possible hostility, and may calculate that he can secure sufficient Commonwealth support for his text to more or less oblige the Prime Minister to go along with it.

8. In recent speeches Mr Fraser has re-affirmed his support for the Brandt Report. He will also be aware of the Arndt Report, commissioned in 1979 by the last Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings, and edited by Professor Arndt of Canberra University. This report was considerably more realistic (and much shorter) than the Brandt Report. It showed a far greater understanding of the workings of the world economy and of the

/current



current state of international negotiations. It is a pity that it has had relatively little attention.

9. Mr Fraser has lobbied hard, but so far without success, for an invitation to the Mexico Summit. He may seek British support for his candidature. If so, it might be best to avoid a firm commitment lest it should cause difficulties with, for example, the Italians. Defensive point 6 is intended to be as forthcoming as possible. It is in fact, unclear whether the issue of participation has been finally settled or not.

Economic Relations Department

8 June 1981

COMMONWEALTH DECLARATION : DRAFT 3

We, the Heads of Government of 44 countries attending the Commonwealth Meeting in Melbourne, affirm unanimously and in the strongest possible terms our conviction that what has become known as the North-South dialogue must be revitalised as a matter of urgency. Ways of ensuring progress in these discussions and negotiations must be found if developed and developing countries are to live together in peace and harmony.

We believe that achieving these goals will require a fusion of political commitment, vision and intellectual realism which has hitherto been lacking on all sides.

If it is to be conducted with the seriousness and responsibility it demands the North-South dialogue must be understood in its historical context. The last 35 years have witnessed a profound transition in the international community, perhaps the most far reaching in the last two centuries. The population of the world has doubled. The number of sovereign states has more than trebled. Huge empires have disappeared. Power and status have been redistributed drastically. The level of interdependence and communication among different states and societies has risen very rapidly. There have been far reaching changes in the conscience of peoples, affecting the prevailing notions of justice, entitlement and responsibility.

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Fundamentally, the North-South dialogue arises from the need - both objective and subjective - to reflect and accommodate these revolutionary changes in the structures and processes of the international community.

While there are legitimate and necessary questions concerning their extent and nature, there can be no serious question that adaptations are necessary. Given the scope and significance of the transition, a "realism" which attempts to base itself on the status quo must fail and in doing so may produce disastrous consequences. Flexibility and adaptability are essential.

The choice therefore is not between change and no change. It is between timely, adequate, negotiated change and disruptive change imposed by breakdown and conflict.

In making this affirmation we do not ignore or minimise the complexity of the issues or the formidable obstacles to progress which exist.

But we assert two things:

First, and overridingly, that what is at stake - in terms of how hundreds of millions of people will live or die; in terms of the prospects for cooperation or conflict; in terms of the prospects for economic surge or stagnation; in terms of the moral and material quality of the world

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order which will prevail - is of such a magnitude that it would be a terrible indictment of this generation if advances were not made due to an absence of will or of a failure of statecraft.

Second, that intrinsically formidable as the problems are, they are not of a kind that will necessarily defeat any effort at substantial progress. Many of the obstacles which at present frustrate negotiations and dialogue can be removed or reduced. Even a modest willingness to look beyond short-term considerations, to interpret self-interest in a reasonably enlightened way and to speak the language of compromise and accommodation rather than of confrontation would result in substantial progress.

We believe that the wider dimensions of the problems involved - including the political dimensions of power and status - should be recognised and faced. They cannot be approached as technical and discrete issues which will yield solutions if only enough expertise and resources are applied. In saying this we are not belittling the need for expertise and high professional competence in the negotiations. We are rather calling for a recognition that these can only operate meaningfully within a framework provided by firm and enlightened political leadership, motivated by an understanding of the historical forces which are at work and by some vision of the future towards which we are moving.

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We recognise that there are important differences of attitudes, values, perspectives and style separating most of the countries of the South from most of the countries of the North. These affect not only the substance of negotiations but the negotiating process itself. They require empathy and a willingness to compromise on both sides if progress is to be made. On the basis of our own experience in the Commonwealth, we know that these are not impossible requirements.

As the Heads of Governments representing more than a quarter of the earth's population, we call on the leaders of all countries to join us in a personal commitment, one that goes beyond rhetoric and beyond narrow realism, to infuse into North-South dialogue a new sense of urgency and purpose.

Only such a commitment can end the present stalemate; and only the ending of that stalemate can provide hope for the future.

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## VISIT OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA

10 - 14 JUNE 1981

## EAST/WEST RELATIONS INCLUDING POLAND

## POINTS TO MAKE

East/West Communication

1. Endorse firm US line on East/West issues: Afghanistan, TNF deployment, Poland. But important to keep open channels of communication. Essential to successful management of East/West relations; 'detente' a possible constraint on Soviet behaviour.

Poland Internal

2. Situation fragile. Risk of damaging government/Solidarity confrontation increased with threat of warning strike on 11 June. Party leadership seems increasingly ineffectual; preoccupied with preparations for Extraordinary Party Congress (14-18 July).

Law and Order

3. Situation worrying. Alleged anti-Soviet manifestations provocative. Could provide Russians pretext for intervention.

Economy

4. Very serious but substantial Western help has probably reduced risk of collapse. Grave concern over Poles' inability to activate economic reform programme or demonstrate any competence in redressing situation. Is Australia helping in any way? West must share burden.

Katowice Forum

5. Propaganda stepped up with endorsement in Soviet media of Katowice Party Forum document which attacks Odnowa and charges Polish leadership with revisionism.

Soviet Attitude

6. Russians gravely concerned by prospect of reformist Polish Congress which promises sweeping changes in party organisation, policy and personnel. May be tempted to pre-empt it, or negate its consequences. Have begun pressure tactics (letter from Soviet Central Committee): others possible, eg manoeuvres, Warsaw Pact summit. Critical period for fate of Polish renewal.

Military Situation

7. No sign of increased military preparedness but Russians could intervene quickly (probably within a few days of taking decision).

Western Contingency Planning

8. Fully agree on importance of Australia being closely associated with NATO contingency planning. Aware of points you have made in contacts with NATO. Will see what we can do in Alliance discussions to stimulate NATO reactions to your points. On our part, need to avoid doing anything which would risk unravelling conclusions reached earlier this year in the Alliance. Danger of leaks.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

## POLAND

Internal Situation

1. No firm leadership. Law and order increasingly disturbed. Government statement of 25 May expressed concern at deteriorating situation and of 'improper attitudes' which had resulted in insults to Soviet troops stationed in Poland and desecration of a Soviet war memorial in Poland.

Solidarity

2. Solidarity National Commission in absence of Walesa in Geneva voted on 3 June to hold limited 2 hour strike on 11 June in protest against failure to prosecute officials involved in police action against Solidarity members in Bydgoszcz in March. Strike threat has induced marked rise in tension. Government/Solidarity talks to prevent strike began on 8 June and Walesa is confident a strike can be averted. Solidarity has welcomed Government decision (5 June) to release leader and three members of the anti-Communist KPN (Confederation of Independent Poland). Only 2 political prisoners now left in jail.

Party

3. Election of delegates to Extraordinary Party Congress (14-18 July) has begun. Likely to lead to markedly reformist Congress (some delegates already elected are members of Solidarity as well as Communist party and a high proportion are 'new men'). Party Commission investigating conduct of former party officials has questioned former First Secretary Gierk. Its deliberations seem to have induced suicides of two former ministers.

Katowice Party Forum

4. Sharp controversy in Polish Party following publication of declaration on 15 May by a group of hardliners calling themselves Katowice Party Forum. Declaration attacked disruptive and revisionist tendencies within PZPR and called for counter-offensive in preparations for Congress. First open condemnation from within Poland of reformist trends in Party. Forum has subsequently criticised Kania by name.

/Soviet



Soviet press has replayed Forum's declaration and renewed charges of revisionism in Polish party. Katowice's documents attacked by Solidarity on 1 June on grounds that these amounted to a justification for Soviet intervention. Union hinted that declaration was Soviet inspired. Polish party leadership condemned declaration on 2 June as 'harmful and unacceptable'.

#### Economy

5. Remains in a critical state. Industrial production down by 12% in first quarter of 1981. On present performance coal production in Poland may fall to 160-165 million tonnes compared with 193 million tonnes in 1980. Exports declined in first quarter of 1981 by 15% to CMEA and 28% to the West. Polish press on 20 May reported serious shortfalls in supplies of raw materials and fuel to Poland's CMEA partners and said some East European countries were threatening to withhold raw materials if Poland failed to deliver its coal. Government proposals for economic reform thrown out by Parliament at end of May for further work and clarification. There is a prevailing sense of drift as Poland's economic performance declines still further.

#### Western Economic Assistance

6. The Australians are not a party to Agreed Minute on Debt Settlement of 27 April. Meeting of Western creditors in Paris on 1/2 June examined Polish requests for a further \$1 1/4 billion commercial credits, but merely agreed to refer the problem to governments without commitment.

#### Soviet Attitude

7. Soviet displeasure at developments in Polish Communist party has been revealed in increasingly hostile criticisms in Soviet and some East European media, of Polish Communist Party and Solidarity. TASS of 3 June accused Solidarity of anti-Sovietism, a charge levelled at reformers in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Soviet Central Committee sent on 5 June a letter to Polish Party leadership apparently calling for firm action against counter-revolutionary tendencies in Polish party and offering Soviet assistance. Central Committee Plenum called for 9 June to discuss Soviet message.

/Contingency planning



Contingency planning : Non-NATO countries

8. The Australian Ambassador in Brussels has been kept informed of NATO's contingency planning on Poland by a contact group composed of the British, Canadian and Netherlands Permanent Representatives. (Similar consultative arrangements, known at the 'Trio' system, have also been instituted to keep New Zealand, Spain and Japan informed of NATO's thinking.) The Australians welcomed this arrangement, which is designed to meet their request that there should be a continuing dialogue on the measures the Western allies would take if there were a Soviet invasion of Poland, to which the Australian Government would be able to contribute substantively.

9. However, the Australians are unhappy at NATO's slowness in responding to their comments. These are now being considered by Deputy Permanent Representatives, but it is likely to be two weeks before the results are reported to the Council. It is not yet clear how much the 'Trio' will be authorised to say to the Australians: but some NATO members, notably the Americans, are reluctant to go very far towards the Australians' desire for close participation in the consultation process, since they fear that to re-open discussion of contingency plans agreed two months ago might lead to unravelling. They also feel that there must be no risk of any public leak of renewed activity in this area at the present time. Inevitably there is a danger that the Australians will get the impression that we are only paying lip-service to the idea of contacts.

10. The Australians know that in the event of an invasion, there would be an emergency session of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels. They asked that this should be accompanied by a separate discussion, in parallel, with the Australian Foreign Minister, who would go to Brussels for this purpose. It has now been generally agreed in NATO that the best way to meet this request would be for the Belgian Foreign Minister, accompanied by Ministers of all countries in 'Trio' groups, to consult the non-NATO allied Foreign Ministers at the time when the emergency session is being held.

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VISIT OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA:

10-14 JUNE 1981

BRIEF NO

AFGHANISTAN

Points to Make

1. Want you to know in advance about new initiative. But please restrict knowledge tightly until announcement.
2. Resistance doing well but danger of international pressure falling away. Therefore want Ten to call on 22 June for International Conference in October/November.

Stage One - to deal with external factors

Permanent members of Security Council plus Pakistan, Iran, India, Secretary-General of Islamic Conference and perhaps a UN representative.

Stage Two - to reach agreement on proposals from Stage One and all other matters relevant to a settlement. Afghan opinion to be represented.

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Essential Facts

Consultations

1. We are consulting few countries at this stage in order to prevent leaks. We intend to brief the Australians in detail two or three days before the proposal is publically announced.

Situation within Afghanistan

2. Resistance seem to be doing better now than for many months past. Recently they have been active in the cities, particularly Kandahar, Herat and Jalalabad. They have maintained notably high levels of activity in the south-east (particularly Pakhtia) and the north-west provinces. Much of central Afghanistan is in the hands of the Resistance. No sign that Russians are making military progress.

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

3. Now more than 2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, with number increasing by over 100,000 a month. The UK has given over £2.4 million to the UNHCR (bilaterally and through the EC) to support these refugees. Are now investigating aid level for the refugees in this financial year.



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VISIT OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA: 10-14 JUNE

S E ASIA (INCLUDING S E ASIAN REFUGEES)

POINTS TO MAKE

CAMBODIA: CONFERENCE

1. Telling Mr Waldheim we shall attend. No decision yet on level of representation, ie whether a Minister or our Permanent Representative in New York. Not much point in a Minister going just to deliver one short speech.
2. In absence of Vietnam and friends, conference will be unable to 'negotiate'. But important that it should be constructive: perhaps commission work by UN Secretariat on role UN could play in ensuring acceptable regime etc in Cambodia after Vietnamese withdrawal.


CAMBODIA: CREDENTIALS OF UNGA

3. Recognise dilemma posed by question of Cambodian credentials at UN. Difficult for public to understand.
4. Our chief concern since our withdrawal of recognition of Democratic Kampuchea (Pol Pot) has been to support ASEAN resistance to creeping acceptance of regime imposed on Cambodia by Vietnamese. It was this that led 74 (including ourselves) to accept DK credentials at 1980 UNGA.

REFUGEES

5. Flow of boat people continues to cause particular concern in Hong Kong. Australian contribution to resettlement good and much appreciated, but could they not do a bit more for Hong Kong, whose problem is unique?

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SOUTH EAST ASIA: ESSENTIAL FACTS

CAMBODIA: UN CONFERENCE

1. UN Cambodia Conference now scheduled provisionally for 13-17 July in New York. Sir A Parsons on present form doubts need for UK Minister to go, but protocol requirements of EC Presidency and pressure from ASEAN may mean a Minister attending for part at least. Present expectations are for a general debate (speeches around 10 minutes) with negotiations in margin on a report/decision/resolution(s). Also that this will be first session, with resumption probably next year.

2. Anticipated Vietnamese and Soviet/East European boycott will show up Vietnam's isolation. But Conference should leave door open for change of tack by Vietnam later, which might be forced as economic pressures mount at home and if Soviet patience begins to run out.

3. Scope for Conference to start non-controversial work on defining a possible UN monitoring and supervisory role after a Vietnamese withdrawal, to provide safeguard against a possible return to power by the Khmer Rouge. Conference might ask UN Secretariat to prepare studies on this in advance of a second session next year.

4. Mr Street will be going on to Manila for the annual 'dialogue' meetings on 19/20 June between ASEAN Foreign Ministers and their opposite numbers from the US, Australia, Japan, Canada and EC Presidency. Mr van der Klaauw will represent the Ten.

Cambodian Credentials at UN General Assembly

5. At the 1980 General Assembly Vietnamese attempts to unseat the Democratic Kampuchean Delegation (ie. the Pol Pot led Khmer Rouge government) were rejected by 74 (UK, Australia)-35-32. In

/March 1981

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- 2 -

March 1981 Australia withdrew recognition from the DK (as we had done in December 1979), and they have since made it known that they are likely to abstain at the next UNGA.

6. The question of continued apparent Australian support for Democratic Kampuchea has been a major domestic issue on which the previous Foreign Minister Mr Peacock chose to focus in his row with Mr Fraser. No UK decision has yet been taken for 1981. The arguments that led us to vote for DK Credentials in 1980 are still broadly valid, but we hope that efforts to create a DK 'coalition' led by Son Sann or Sihanouk with Khmer Rouge relegated to the sidelines will produce a more acceptable delegation this year.

#### S E Asian Refugees

7. Although Australia is the fifth largest receiver of S E Asian refugees (nearly 50,000, of whom 40,000 are Vietnamese boat people, after USA, China, Canada and France), her policy has not been very helpful from the UK point of view. She has taken only just over 2,100 from Hong Kong out of 87,000 so far resettled from there. She has also demanded 'guarantees' from us in respect of boat people picked up at sea and landed at N Australian ports by British registered ships.

8. There are still some 15,700 refugees in Hong Kong awaiting resettlement or about a third of the total of boat people in camps throughout the region. Bearing in mind Hong Kong's very high population density and very limited land area, this presents problems not faced by other places of first asylum in the area.

South East Asian Department

9 June 1981

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VISIT OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA

10 - 14 JUNE 1981

EC MATTERS

POINTS TO MAKE

EC/Australia and CAP reform

1. Pressure for CAP reform increasing with approach of one per cent VAT ceiling and enlargement. Will form important element in restructuring negotiations during UK Presidency.
2. UK objective is to eliminate high cost surpluses. Export subsidies a drain on EC budget and cause conflict with more efficient exporters of agricultural produce like Australia. But not realistic to expect them to be eliminated overnight.
3. Appreciate pressure on Australian Government to take a robust line. But in dealing with EC threats of indiscriminate retaliation tend to unite moderates with extremists on the latter's ground.
4. Unfortunate effect on bilateral relations if UK interests were to be damaged by Australian retaliation.
5. (If raised) 1981 increase in guaranteed prices (9.5%) still below EC average inflation rate.

/ESSENTIAL FACTS

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Australians are long-standing and vociferous critics of the CAP. They dislike EC trade barriers (their agricultural exports to the UK have dropped 80 per cent since 1973 but they have found other markets). And, perhaps even more, they dislike the subsidised disposal by the EC of high cost surpluses on world markets in competition with Australian produce.

2. During the last twelve months the Australians' specific grievances have been:

(a) sheepmeat where an agreement was eventually reached in September 1980. The UK opted for deficiency payments instead of intervention. The Australians obtained a reduction in the tariff on their exports to the Community from 20 per cent to 10 per cent. They were also given an undertaking that the EC would only use export refunds in respect of traditional EC export trade (which is small) and thus not displace Australian exports from third markets. The Australians agreed in exchange to voluntary restraint on quantities exported to the EC. These quantities were generous in comparison with traditional sendings;

(b) manufacturing beef where the Australians interpret an ambiguously worded agreement reached in 1979 as part of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations as a firm commitment by the Community to set the EC quota at not less than 60,000 tonnes per year. This figure was finally agreed for 1981 by the March Agriculture Council along with a number of

/other

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other issues settled as part of the price fixing package. The Australians had previously made a major issue out of it (see para. 3 below) despite its very limited economic importance for them;

(c) sugar where the Australians have secured a GATT ruling that the EC used export subsidies in 1978/79 to obtain a 'more than equitable' share of world trade. We hope the new EC sugar regime (starts 30 June) will prevent this recurring. It involves some reduction in production quotas (particularly for UK) and should help to discourage surplus production by shifting the financial burden of disposal onto producers themselves.

3. Mr Anthony (Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the National (Country) Party) laid great stress in the Australian election campaign last autumn on the fact that he had finally secured the Commission's agreement to resolve the manufacturing beef issue on terms satisfactory to Australia. The fact that his personal credibility was to some extent at stake may have accounted for the Australian Government's action in subsequently threatening indiscriminate retaliation against all EC member states (and specifically against defence procurement contracts of interest to the UK). The Lord Privy Seal made it clear to the then Australian High Commissioner, Mr Plimsoll, how unhelpful this line was. But the impression seems to have gained ground in Canberra that threats of retaliation are an effective tactic for dealing with problems with the EC. There may be more trouble

/ahead

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ahead since we have had indications that the Australians intend to return to the charge in the GATT over sugar and may also submit a complaint over renewed payment by the EC of export subsidies for beef.

4. The Australians are not immune from charges of protectionism themselves. The EC is pursuing complaints in the GATT over Australian restrictions on imports of cars, footwear and fork-lift trucks. Footwear is particularly sensitive for the UK.

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VISIT OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA: 10-14 JUNE 1981

BRIEF NO DEFENCE QUESTIONS

Points to Make

Defence of Western interests outside Europe

1. Welcome Australian willingness to share burden of defence of Western interests. Australians in turn no doubt welcome NATO's recent acknowledgement of need for consultation with Alliance's friends, to encourage stability and reduce risks of crisis in the third world. Our own capability to deploy forces overseas, though modest, will be retained. And we do a great deal to assist friendly third-world countries with military training and advice.

Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)

2. Continue to welcome moves to revitalise the arrangements. But onus for renewed activity must, given our other commitments, rest with regional members (Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand).
3. UK participation must be on 'opportunity basis'. However MOD hope to contribute:
- a. 2 RN patrol craft from Hong Kong for June maritime exercise off East Malaysia;
  - b. company group of Gurkhas for July/August land exercise in Australia;
  - c. occasional Canberra for air exercises.
4. No objection to US participating with 'observer' status.

UK Defence Programme [if raised]

5. Basic problem is to bring defence programme into line with likely available resources. Even given target of 3% real growth per year in defence budget, soaring equipment costs make readjustments necessary.
6. Changing nature of threat anyway necessitates review of balance between different aspects of UK defence efforts in NATO context.
7. Many options being considered. No decisions yet made.

VISIT OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA: 10-14 JUNE 1981

BRIEF NO DEFENCE QUESTIONS

Essential Facts

Australian Defence Policy

1. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and instability in South East Asia, have led to shift in Australian defence policy. Consequences have included higher level of planned defence expenditure and greater willingness to cooperate with Western allies, as instanced by acceptance of US proposals for upgrading bases on its territories, to enable them to be used for B-52 operations, and by a contribution to Western naval presence (not, of course, in multi-national framework) in the Gulf of Oman.

Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)

2. The 1971 FPDA (UK/Australia/New Zealand/Malaysia/Singapore) commits us to consult with our partners in event, or threat, of external attack on Malaysia and Singapore. No actual commitment to intervene militarily.

3. Mr Fraser's call last year for revitalising the FPDA has spawned several ideas including multilateral training and more naval visits. UK took part in an exercise planning conference in Canberra in November 1980 and a meeting of the Joint Consultative Council in Kuala Lumpur in January which endorsed proposals for series of multinational maritime, land and air exercises for 1981-83. All partners understand the obstacles to regular UK participation.

26 May 1981  
Defence Department  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

STREET, THE HON ANTHONY AUSTIN, MP

Minister for Foreign Affairs since November 1980. Member of the Cabinet.

Born Melbourne 1926. Educated at Melbourne Church of England Grammar School. Served in the RAN, 1945-46. Farmer.

Liberal member for Corangamite (Victoria) since 1966. Member, Federal Executive Council, 1971-72; Assistant Minister for Labour and National Service; Member, Opposition Parliamentary Executive 1973-75. Spokesman on science and technology, and the Australian Capital Territory, 1973-74, and on labour affairs, 1974-75. Minister for Labour and Immigration in Mr Fraser's Caretaker Government, November 1975. Was also Minister for Employment from December 1975 to December 1978 when it was hived off to become a new department. Minister for Industrial Relations 1975-80.

Close to Mr Fraser, with moderate views on labour relations. A short man. Sensible and likeable. He managed to keep Government-Trade Union relations remarkably smooth despite adverse circumstances, through his willingness to talk to the ACTU and ability to compromise without damaging government economic policy. Well disposed towards Britain.

Married 1951 V E Rickard; 3 sons. Mrs Street is a charming lady with a strong sense of fun.

A keen sportsman, Mr Street has twice represented Victoria Country XIs against international touring cricket teams. He toured Britain as a captain of the Australian Old Collegians Cricket Team.

He also plays golf and tennis and has held a private pilot's licence for many years.

Red Crest

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE  
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN  
AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Visit of  
The Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of Australia  
and Mrs. Street

10 to 14 JUNE 1981

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia and Mrs. Street will be accompanied by:

Mr. A.R. Parsons,  
Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs

Mr. T. O'Loughlin,  
Senior Private Secretary,

Miss L. Sciberra  
Private Secretary

In attendance:

Mr. Neville Coppel }  
Miss Sheana Strachan } - Government Hospitality

The visitors will be staying at:

The Dorchester Hotel  
Park Lane, London, W.1

WEDNESDAY, 10 JUNE

0655 hrs Arrive London Heathrow Airport by Flight OF 1  
Alcock and Brown Suite, Terminal 3

Met by the Special Representative of the Secretary  
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,  
Sir David Muirhead

0715  
(approx) Leave the Airport by car

0800 Arrive at the Dorchester Hotel  
Park Lane  
London, W.1.

No official engagements until the evening

1740 Leave the hotel

1800 Arrive Royal Commonwealth Society  
Northumberland Avenue, W.C.2

Met by the Secretary General,  
Mr. Stephen Kemp

1930  
(approx) Leave the Royal Commonwealth Society

1945  
(approx) Arrive at the hotel

No official engagements

THURSDAY, 11 JUNE

0840 hrs Leave the hotel

0845 Call on the Commonwealth Secretary-General,  
His Excellency Mr. Shridath Surendranath Ramphal  
The Garden House  
40B Hill Street, W.1

0945 Leave The Garden House  
(approx) and return to the hotel

No official engagements

FRIDAY, 12 JUNE

(See page      for programme for Mrs. Street)

0925 hrs    Leave the hotel

0945            Arrive at the Australian High Commission  
Australia House  
Strand, W.C.2

1050            Leave the Australian High Commission

1100            Call on the Prime Minister,  
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
10 Downing Street.

1130            Talks with the Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs,  
The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Ambassadors' Entrance

Leave the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1300            Luncheon given by Her Majesty's Government  
for  
1315            Host: The Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs,  
The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington  
1 Carlton Gardens, S.W.1

1430            Leave 1 Carlton Gardens  
(approx)        and return to the hotel

No official engagements



PROGRAMME FOR MRS. STREET

FRIDAY, 12 JUNE

0940 hrs Leave the hotel

1000 Arrive at St. Thomas' Hospital  
Lambeth Palace Road, S.E.1  
Met by the Assistant Liaison Officer,  
Miss Christine Archer  
Introduced to Senior Administrators

1200 Leave St. Thomas' Hospital

1230 Arrive Stoke Lodge  
45 Hyde Park Gate, S.W.7

1300 Luncheon given by Mrs. Garland

1530 Leave Stoke Lodge

Engagements for the afternoon to be arranged

SATURDAY, 13 JUNE

1010 hrs Leave the hotel

1030 Arrive 10 Downing Street

1100 Attend ceremony of Trooping the Colour  
Dress: Morning Coat or Lounge Suit

1200 Reception given by the Prime Minister  
and Mr. Denis Thatcher

1230 Leave 10 Downing Street  
(approx)

1245 Arrive at the hotel  
(approx)

1305 Leave the hotel

1325 Arrive Lord's Cricket Ground

Met by

1330 Luncheon

Attend Middlesex v Australians

1600 Leave Lord's Cricket Ground  
(approx)

1715 Arrive at The Manor House  
(approx) Bledlow, near Aylesbury, Bucks

Stay overnight as guests of the Secretary of State for  
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
and the Lady Carrington

SUNDAY, 4 JUNE

1000 hrs Leave Bledlow  
(approx)

1115 Arrive at the hotel  
(approx)

No official engagements during the day

1715 Leave the hotel

1800 Arrive London Heathrow Airport  
De Havilland Suite, Terminal 1

1825 Board Flight BA 326 departing at 1845 hours

The Special Representative of the Secretary of State  
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,  
Sir David Muirhead,  
Will bid farewell