

155359

14

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 11, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *[Signature]*

1. Washington Post Story and Angola. Today's Washington Post reported -- inaccurately -- that we have alerted Congress to an impending request that the restrictions on economic and military aid to factions in Angola be lifted.

In fact, Cap and I recently reached agreement on several changes in security assistance legislation that would increase our flexibility in protecting our interest abroad. One of these concerned Angola. Pending your approval, however, we have not consulted with the Hill and you should receive a decision memorandum on this subject tomorrow. (C)

2. Tentative Settlement of Belize Dispute. Concluding secret talks this week in London, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister and the Premier of Belize signed an agreement today facilitating the peaceful independence of Belize by year's end.

We urged this settlement on the Guatemalan and British foreign ministers during their recent visits to Washington. By reducing the potential for Cuban meddling and contributing to regional stability, the agreement is a success for your policy in Central America (C)

3. Meeting with British Defense Secretary Nott. In an extremely cordial meeting this afternoon, British Defense Secretary Nott pledged British support for our Rapid Deployment Force and agreed to inform the Saudis and the Gulf States (he will be visiting there soon) that the new American Administration understood the Soviet threat to their part of world and intended to help them resist it. Nott was informed of our view that it was opportune for the West to achieve a new consensus with the Middle Eastern states on security. It was also important that the Europeans not undercut the Camp David process. Nott agreed but believed that the Europeans could still play a useful role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. (S)

4. Visit of Japanese Ambassador. Japanese Ambassador Okawara expressed Japan's concern that direct U.S. military aid to Beijing might eventually threaten Japan, disturb other Asians and provoke the Soviets. The Ambassador was assured that our intention to consolidate our relationship with the PRC did not involve an arms supply at this time. Okawara also hoped we would be cautious in dealing with Taiwan.

The Ambassador was informed that we and our European allies believed that Japan must do more in providing for its own defense; its foreign assistance should be applied to such strategic countries as Jamaica, Turkey and Pakistan. We also wanted Japan to handle the PLO issue in the context of our wider interest: strengthening the Western strategic posture in the area.

Finally, Okawara was asked to stress to his Government that the automobile issue must be handled with sensitivity to the political pressures here. (LOU)

RDS 2/3 3/11/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

DECLASSIFIED
NLR/MSB/27155359
BY CA NARA DATE 7/31/16

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

1.0.
13

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

March 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 11, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

RW
3/11/81